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Abstract: Network traffic exhibits a high level of variability over short periods of time. This 
variability impacts negatively on the accuracy of anomaly-based network intrusion detection 
systems (IDS) that are built using predictive models in a batch learning setup. This work investigates 
how adapting the discriminating threshold of model predictions, specifically to the evaluated traffic, 
improves the detection rates of these intrusion detection models. Specifically, this research studied 
the adaptability features of three well known machine learning algorithms: C5.0, Random Forest 
and Support Vector Machine. Each algorithm’s ability to adapt their prediction thresholds was 
assessed and analysed under different scenarios that simulated real world settings using the 
prospective sampling approach. Multiple IDS datasets were used for the analysis, including a newly 
generated dataset (STA2018). This research demonstrated empirically the importance of threshold 
adaptation in improving the accuracy of detection models when training and evaluation traffic have 
different statistical properties. Tests were undertaken to analyse the effects of feature selection and 
data balancing on model accuracy when different significant features in traffic were used. The 
effects of threshold adaptation on improving accuracy were statistically analysed. Of the three 
compared algorithms, Random Forest was the most adaptable and had the highest detection rates. 
Keywords: Intrusion Detection System; anomaly-based IDS; Threshold adaptation; Prediction 
accuracy improvement; Machine Learning; STA2018 dataset; C5.0; Random Forest; Support Vector 
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1. Introduction 
In the current digital age, numerous research papers and applications have been written and 
have developed proposed solutions to combat network based threats and to protect information 
systems. As a result, various security systems have emerged, which aim to ensure that the key goals 
of cybersecurity are met [1]. However, every day these stated security goals are flagrantly violated 
by breaches and security incidents, which raises questions about the capability of existing security 
systems.  
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are one of the many tools used in the cyber security field. Their 
main purpose is to detect security attacks targeting the critical networks, systems or data that they 
monitor, and to report any violation by an external intruder or system insider.  
With the rapid advancement in technology many new challenges and threats are evolving. As 
most of these technologies share the same communication networks, many challenges have emerged; 
extensive data, traffic diversity and encryption. Such challenges made the identification of threats to 
develop the right protective measure a very difficult task.  
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There are many areas being explored to address some of the many cyber security requirements; 
artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML) and data mining (DM) methods are some of the 
current key research topics in this field, particularly in the area of anomaly-based intrusion detection 
(ID). These methods aim to overcome the limitation of human capabilities and conventional 
technologies in handling the very large amounts and existing diversity of exchanged traffic.   
As network traffic evolves over time, due to changes in services and users and their behaviours, 
the capability of these methods to adapt to such changes is being challenged. Ever evolving traffic 
makes the process of building ID models a particularly challenging task, as learning all possible 
variations of traffic patterns for all different kinds of traffic and users is an impossible quest. 
Therefore, there is a pressing need to make intelligent detection methods adaptable to traffic 
variability. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe the problem that 
we address in this paper. In Section 3, we discuss related work for threshold adaptation techniques, 
applications and main research gap. Section 4 presents the proposed solution, which has been 
empirically investigated. Section 5 describes the experimental setting and data sets used. In Section 
6, we present and thoroughly discuss the results of the first set of experiments that aimed to serve as 
a proof of concept. In Section 7, we discuss the results of the second set of experiments that 
investigated threshold adaptation under different feature sets and data balance scenarios. Finally, 
Section 8 concludes this work and lists future work and directions.   
2. Problem Statement 
In a typical (batch-based) scenario, a network-based anomaly ID model would be built to protect 
specific environments from attackers. The model building phase would require some training data 
that were previously captured from old traffic to generate the ID model, which would be tuned and 
set to detect anomalous behaviours. However, as such a model is used to analyse new, real traffic, it 
will suffer from high false alarms and low detection accuracy. These phenomena are usually caused 
by the changes in network patterns, and lead to an early phasing out of such a model and a triggering 
of model regeneration or updating phase. This could be linked to the inefficiency of using a fixed 
discriminating threshold for such ID models. For example, a network under high volume attacks, 
such as denial of service (DoS) or scan attacks, would have different class (normal to attack) 
distributions than when under low volume, but stealthy attacks such as SQL injection and command-
and-control (C&C).  
Most of the learning and classification methods used in building such ID models are based on a 
number of key assumptions [2,3], such as: (i) the equal representation of classes, (ii) the equal representation 
of sub concepts for a specific class, (iii) the similar class conditional distributions of all classes, and (iv) the pre 
defining and knowledge of all the values of the attributes for all records in the dataset. Due to the traffic 
evolution, most, if not all, of these assumptions are violated in real environments, as new traffic will 
start to exhibit different statistical properties to those of the training data.  
Unpredictable differences between the training and evaluated (tested) data can be introduced 
over time because of such traffic evolution, known as concept drift. These differences can take various 
forms; for example, class distributions might differ in the new data from those used to build the ID 
model, and even new classes might emerge over time. In addition, class balance (also known as data 
balance) can play an important role in the accuracy of constructed models, which could be affected 
as a result of pattern changes. Traffic variability might also bring about differences in feature 
importance. These effects (collectively or individually) might render the learnt model outdated 
sooner than anticipated. However, the current methods to deal with these effects (in a batch-based 
setup) will attempt to generate a new model, which may consume additional resources in collecting 
and labelling new data to be used to learn that new model.    
Many studies have attempted to address some of these issues in real time setups by tuning the 
detection parameters of the ID models, while others have introduced ensemble methods for data 
stream setups. However, there is insufficient empirical work to analyse the threshold adaptation of 
model predictions in binary batch learning (offline learning) setups [4].  
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The low detection accuracy of such score-based anomaly ID models in a batch learning setup, 
could be linked to the use of a fixed discriminating threshold, which in turn could result in an 
inaccurate reading of the accuracy that is far lower than the actual optimal accuracy. This might 
explain the early termination of such ID models. As a result, adapting the discriminating threshold 
to the predictions of the evaluated network traffic would provide an accurate reading of the actual 
accuracy of the ID model. Understanding this will lead to an improvement in detection accuracy, and 
hence an extension in the lifespan of the ID models. 
Therefore, in this paper we address this problem by investigating the effect of adapting the 
discriminating threshold (specifically to the evaluated network traffic) on the accuracy (i.e., the 
geometric mean (G-Mean) of accuracy) of multiple models and comparing the results with the use of 
a fixed threshold. This investigation was done by comparing the effects on traffic collected at different 
times with existing variability. Further, the ability of different types of ML algorithms to adapt to 
traffic changes was analysed. 
3. Related Work 
Security researchers have been aware that the performance of IDS were tightly related to the 
behavioural patterns of users, as well as to the characteristics of various underlying services and 
protocols. Anomaly-based methods were introduced to address possible deviations from normal 
behaviours in order to flag intrusions. These anomaly-based methods suffered from high false alarms, 
the key reason being their inability to adapt themselves to changes in data patterns (new data) over 
time. As a result, many proposals have been put forward to address this issue, including methods 
that adapt to such changes, such as model updating and rule tuning techniques. Other research has 
looked into the benefits of using adaptive or tuneable thresholds for the IDS measures to flag 
anomalies, rather than relying on fixed thresholds. The following section presents the key works in 
this area. 
Chen et al. [5] suggested performing threshold tuning for the predictions of classification 
methods that generate a quantitative output (score), so that the threshold can be set at different values 
to assign class labels. Catania and Garino [6] suggested performing tuning on statistical based models 
whenever a change in network traffic patterns is detected by making adjustments to the normal 
model. 
In an attempt to understand the importance of the right threshold selection on the performance 
of prediction models, Freeman and Moisen [7] investigated 11 optimisation criteria of threshold 
selection, and concluded that sensitivity to threshold selection demonstrates a low prevalence or a 
poor model quality. However, many anomaly detection methods have been developed assuming that 
anomalous traffic forms a minority compared to normal traffic, and, due to the evolving nature of 
traffic, the quality of these detection models tends to deteriorate over time. Therefore, a key 
consideration is that threshold adaptation should help improve the quality of these models in terms 
of accuracy before they are phased out.   
To address model tuning, the conventional (batch learning) modelling process usually has two 
main phases: training and testing. At the modelling stage, training (learning) data are used to build 
a prediction model, which is then used to predict the test (evaluation) data. Buczak and Guven [8] 
stressed the importance of having three phases, in which they suggested that the training data be 
used to build multiple models using different ML/DM algorithms with different parameters. The 
validation data, which is used in the second phase, could then be used to select the best model(s) and 
to estimate their errors before they are used to predict or classify the testing data. Buczak and Guven 
[8] recommended that the selected model should not be fine-tuned (model parameter tuning) based 
on how it performed on the test data, to avoid reporting overly optimistic results, i.e., reporting 
accuracy rates that might not be true for another test dataset. However, many of the recommended 
adaptive real time systems (see Section 3.2) perform tuning on detection rules. Therefore, threshold 
tuning based on the prediction scores of a model could provide a tool to tune the system over time. 
However, the single fine-tuning recommendation may not be appropriate, as it may be based on the 
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assumption that test datasets, including future unseen data, have similar statistical properties; which 
is not a valid assumption given the variable nature of network traffic.   
In an attempt to find the right discriminating threshold for the detection model, Beguería [9] 
suggested the use of validation data. The selected threshold is then used to classify the records in the 
evaluation/test data, based on the scores returned by the prediction model. However, Beguería [9] 
does not appear to take into account the variability of behaviour in input (traffic) data over time.  
Overall, there are three main themes in model tuning and adaptability to traffic pattern changes, 
and these are outlined below. 
3.1. Batch learning 
Yang [10] proposed score based local optimisation (SCut) as a strategy to select a threshold based 
on optimising a performance measure, such as accuracy. SCut is therefore the threshold at which a 
performance measure would be maximised or minimised. To the best of our knowledge, no studies 
have explored model adaptation for changes in network traffic by tuning the threshold of the 
predictions of a model within a batch learning setup.   
Lakhina et al. [11] used principal component analysis (PCA) to separate a high-dimensional 
space of network traffic measurements into disjoint subspaces. Each subspace corresponded to 
normal or anomalous network settings. They used a fixed threshold (3σ deviation from the mean) to 
separate the principal axes into normal and anomalous sets, and found that the first four principal 
components represented the normal subspace for the cases they analysed. This study did not address 
the variability of traffic over time, and so requires further analysis of its performance when traffic 
conditions vary.    
In an attempt to investigate the effect of threshold tuning on multi class predictions, Fan and 
Lin [12] concluded the effectiveness of tuning approaches on the performance of classification 
techniques. They used the 5-folds cross-validation (CV) technique to evaluate these effects. However, 
the CV technique may not maintain the statistical differences between the training and the testing 
data, leading to overly optimistic results. The authors analysed the effect of different optimisation 
metrics (macro average F-measure, micro average F-measure and exact match ratio) on the overall 
performance of the selected threshold. They then investigated this tuning approach using validation 
data, without considering whether such tuning was required for every independent evaluation 
process or whether the selected threshold could be used for future evaluations performed by the 
prediction model. Pillai et al. [13] also investigated the issue of threshold selection for multi label 
classification problems by optimising the F-measure and precision-recall curve. They used 5-folds 
CV on five datasets to validate their results. The results were compared to the evaluation/testing data 
by using the optimal threshold that had been selected on the basis of the validation data. However, 
the authors did not extend their analysis to comparing their results with those where the threshold 
had been tuned for the testing data. They concluded that selecting an optimal threshold based on 
maximising the micro F-measure can lead to overfitting.  
Koyejo et al. [14] investigated the optimisation of a binary classifier using different metrics where 
they identified the optimal threshold based on the conditional probability of the positive (normal) 
class using training and validation data. Yan et al. [15] pointed out that this search requires prior 
knowledge of the optimal classifier, which is usually unknown in reality. As a result, Yan et al. [15] 
identified two key properties (the Karmic property and the Threshold Quasi Concavity property), 
and they theoretically demonstrated that the Bayes optimal classifier is a threshold function of the 
conditional probability of a positive class.  Again, these works do not seem to assume a change in 
data over time (concept drift), as the threshold is only set once using the validation set. In general, 
nearly all approaches in the batch learning methods adopt the recommendations of using a single 
validation dataset to select the right threshold. 
3.2. Real-time learning 
In an early study, Eskin et al. [16] proposed an adaptive host-based ID model generation. Their 
framework, which is similar to that of Honig et al. [17], recommends the aggregation of all data, i.e., 
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system calls, into a single data warehouse. This data can then be used to train detection models, which 
can in turn be distributed to hosts to detect intrusions. The adaptability of this framework is in the 
deployment of models on the hosts. However, this framework uses a fixed threshold to flag anomalies 
without addressing the variability between the hosts. There is a scalability limitation, as storing such 
large amounts of data will become a serious issue over time.   
Hossain and Bridges [18] proposed a framework for adaptive IDS using fuzzy data mining. This 
framework aims to minimise the human intervention in the adjustments of the profiles used to 
describe normal traffic by the IDS. The tuning process is designed to operate on a real-time IDS. 
Hossain et al. [19] evaluated this framework by using a sliding window to update the profile, so that 
the updating process used the data that fell within that time window. It appears that they considered 
all traffic, other than simulated portscans, as benign. The system produced results that the authors 
could not explain, which could be attributed to the lack of controls over the traffic that was analysed.  
Jung et al. [20] developed a threshold random walk (TRW) algorithm to detect random portscan 
attacks in a real-time setup, based on the observations of the state (successful or unsuccessful) of 
connection attempts from a remote host to newly-visited local addresses. However, this model 
assumed that all distinct connection attempts had the same likelihood of success, while no correlation 
between these attempts was assumed. Ali et al. [21] pointed out that threshold adaptation was only 
performed on the upper boundary of the likelihood ratio, based on previously observed instances, 
while the lower boundary was fixed.  
Idé and Kashima [22] investigated the development of an IDS to detect anomalies in multi-tier 
systems, such as web-based systems. They used a weighted graph to extract a feature vector of service 
activities. As this IDS models service activities in the system, where the directions of these activities 
are assumed to be stable, services that are rarely used may not benefit from its detection capabilities. 
As a result, services run by careful adversaries, such as command and control (C&C) might not be 
flagged up.   
Yu et al. [23] proposed an automatically tuning IDS (ATIDS) system, which used feedback from 
the security officer about encountered false predictions to automatically tune the threshold of the rule 
sets in real-time. This system is dependent on the human resources available, so Yu et al. [24] 
proposed an extension that adjusts the number of alarms flagged to security operators based on their 
abilities. Although this extension minimised the burden on security officers, the overall performance 
of the system was limited by the time it took to provide feedback. This system also failed to cope with 
drastic changes in system behaviour, as the tuning process was performed on the rules level of the 
detection model and these rules set might not be representative of new behaviour due to concept or 
feature drift.  
Ali et al. [21] proposed a generic threshold tuning algorithm so that the detection threshold of 
any score-based anomaly detection systems (ADS) could be adapted. In their approach, statistical 
and information theoretical analyses were undertaken on the anomaly scores produced by multiple 
network-based and host-based ADSs. These analyses aimed to reveal consistent structures of time 
correlation during periods of normal activity. This approach targeted anomalies that cause a 
detectable variability in traffic patterns due to their high volume, such as UDPFlood, TCP SYN Flood 
and TCP SYN portscans attacks. This is designed for score-based real-time detectors (not batch), as 
they quantify the anomaly score based on a comparison between the learned profile and the run-time 
profile.  
Chou and Wang [25] proposed an adaptive network IDS for cloud environments. They claimed 
that their system had the capability to perform automatic labelling of raw network traffic (normal 
and anomalous). They used a spectral clustering algorithm (unsupervised learning) to cluster the 
unlabelled network traffic so that the clusters could later be used as labels to construct a decision-
tree-based detection model. These clusters (labelled data) were used to improve the original detector 
and to adapt it to the network environment. However, the authors used DARPA 2000 and KDD 1999 
datasets in their experiments, without any justification as to why such old data had been selected for 
this scenario. They also proposed an experimental design that overlooked any DDoS attacks in 
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DARPA 2000, claiming that this type of attack would generate lots of connections. This decision calls 
into question how their system would perform in a real life setup.  
Agosta et al. [26] introduced a distributed anomaly detection system (ADS) to detect worm 
threats. This system employed a threshold adaptation technique, to compare it with the performance 
of a fixed threshold. This study concluded that the adaptive threshold technique was far superior. 
However, these techniques were specifically designed for this type of attack, and the ability to 
generalise these results to other classes of threat is debatable.   
Gu et al. [27] devised a framework to measure the effectiveness of IDS quantitatively. This 
method is based on quantifying the feature representation capability, classification information loss 
and overall intrusion detection capability of an IDS using a set of information-theoretic metrics. The 
authors discussed the importance of dynamic fine tuning over static fine tuning to address the issue 
of traffic variability over time. Their framework introduced dynamic fine tuning by dividing the time 
series into a number of intervals. However, Strasburg et al. [28] have raised concerns about the 
practical effectiveness of such a model in IDS development.  
Jyothsna and Rama Prasad [29] studied a meta-heuristic assessment model, which aimed to set 
a threshold for random normal behaviour in real-time by estimating the degree of intrusion scope 
threshold from a given network transaction. Their model also aimed to identify any new intrusions 
in the network, and feature correlation methods were performed to reduce processing and time costs. 
This approach did not cater for the effect of concept drift on the selected features over time, and hence 
on a model’s performance.  
3.3. Data stream learning 
In the data stream learning methods, the concept drift is a core feature that is considered in the 
modelling process. Bifet et al. [30] proposed a new data stream framework which aimed to address 
concept drift by employing ensemble methods using various bagging techniques. They later 
developed this framework into an open source software known as Massive Online Analysis (MOA) 
[31].   
Masud et al. [32] proposed a classification method to address concept drift in data classes, that 
is, the emergence of unseen classes (labels). Usually, new class labels require a longer time to be 
provided with new training data to rebuild the base detection models. Therefore, Masud et al. applied 
some clustering concepts to measure the distance between known classes and new data instances, so 
that this technique could flag up these new instances as anomalies. Farid et al. [33] stated that such 
models would need to gather a large number of test instances to determine their similarities and 
differences in order to identify any novel classes.  
In an earlier study, Masud et al. [34] proposed another detection approach for novel classes that 
used an adaptive threshold and the Gini coefficient for outlier detection. However, the proposed 
approach is unable to distinguish between the novel classes if multiple new classes have emerged, 
and it also does not cater for other types of evolution, such as feature drift [35].    
In order to automatically determine the optimal parameters of an anomaly detector (AD) Cretu-
Ciocarlie et al. [36] enhanced the training phase by introducing a self-calibration stage. Their method 
consisted of applying ensemble methods to unsupervised learning techniques to build micro-models. 
A weighted voting scheme on labels returned by these micro-models was used to compute a final 
class decision. However, this approach could result into an AD that might be subject to attack, as an 
adversary could train it. This approach may fail to differentiate between a real change in traffic 
patterns and an ongoing crafted attack aimed at skewing the majority votes of the micro-models. 
Chen et al. [37] suggested the offline mining of an old data stream to build high-quality models 
for every recurrent concept. When concept drift is later detected in a data stream, it could then be 
evaluated to identify the type of concept, so that the traffic could be passed to the most suitable pre-
built model to classify the traffic in that stream. This technique claims to achieve high rates of 
accuracy because of the high-order models, but it assumes that there is a finite number of concepts to 
be modelled. This assumption is challenged by the high volume and diversity of network traffic. In 
addition, there are scalability issues. 
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In a more recent work, Gomes et al. [38] proposed an adaptive random forest (ARF) algorithm 
that was suitable for evolving data streams. This algorithm has the potential to address concept drift 
by adapting itself to any changes. The adaptation is performed by replacing any outdated trees in the 
forest with new trees that have been grown (trained) in the background.  
3.4. Research gaps 
As presented, the importance of adaptation to pattern variability has mainly been addressed in 
the context of real time and data stream problems. Most of the adaptation and tuning approaches for 
real-time-based systems target certain classes of attack which are formed of abrupt patterns, such as 
DoS attacks. As these attacks introduce high variability into traffic patterns, much research has 
attempted to detect them and fine tune the system accordingly. In most cases, these tuning 
approaches would aim to adapt the IDS detection parameters to increase or decrease the thresholds 
of these parameters. However, Catania and Garino [6] pointed out that most of the adaptation 
approaches are aware of the high network variability, and the proposed methods provide the 
required adaptability features to adjust for the targeted anomalies. Similarly, in the data stream field, 
most of the proposed approaches suggest building new detection models to adapt to such changes 
[21].  
As for the batch learning tasks, in an ideally designed experiment, adaptation is undertaken only 
once for the prediction model, using validation data [8,39]. Validation data is used to estimate class 
distributions in order to calculate the optimal threshold for the prediction model. However, in a real 
life setup, these distributions are not fixed, which renders such approaches ineffective. Furthermore, 
using a fixed threshold for predictive models could result in an inaccurate reading of the model’s 
performance, which could in turn lead to the selection of weaker models or an early phasing out of 
good models. However, no study exists to investigate continuous adaptation for every evaluation/test 
datum in a batch-based setup. Therefore, in this paper we investigate such an approach.   
Moreover, in batch learning approaches, there is a reliance on the K-folds cross-validation (CV) 
technique to evaluate models, and, when attempting to address the pattern change problem, 
validation data is the alternative suggested approach. Such an approach is used to select the best 
threshold based on the optimisation of some measure, such as the accuracy, for the prediction model. 
However, no study has investigated how a fixed threshold will behave under different setups. 
Additionally, as model development is based on various decisions taken in relation to the training 
data (such as feature selection and data balancing), it is important to analyse how such decisions 
might affect the model performance when traffic changes over time and causes concept or feature 
drift. It is also important to address whether the threshold (tuning) adaptation of model predictions 
have any effect on eliminating or mitigating such limitations.    
4. Threshold Adaptation 
As noted earlier, the adaptation capability of prediction models under the batch learning setups 
is the least investigated area in comparison to other methods, although the batch-based ID models 
are important to detect novel attacks that cannot usually be detected by other techniques. Some kinds 
of attacks are better detected in a batch mode to increase the detection rate, rather than attempting 
faster detection in real-time with a higher failure rate. With this approach, there is no need to change 
or tune any of a model’s parameters as long as its predictions are in the form of a probability score. 
In this sense, threshold adaptation does not require any modification to the anomaly detection model. 
The detection model is thus treated as a black-box, as the adaptation is performed to its predictions 
and not to its detection parameters.  
5. Experimental Settings 
In this section, the experimental settings used in all conducted experiments are presented. Three 
ML algorithms were used and their main settings are explained. All the experiments were evaluated 
in terms of detection accuracy using the geometric mean of accuracy (gAcc) [40] measure, as the 
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normal accuracy measure can be a very misleading measure due to its sensitivity to class imbalance. 
Similarly to other performance assessments of classification models in a supervised learning task, the 
gAcc uses the computed basic counts of a table known as a confusion (error) matrix [41] (see Table 
1).  
The gAcc computes the classification accuracies of every class separately, and then computes 
their geometric mean. Equation 1 shows the general formula used to compute this measure, where 
Cj,i is the number of class i instances that were predicted as j, and n is the total number of classes.   
gAcc=√∏
ci,j
∑ cj,i
n
j=1
n
i=1
n
 (1) 
Table 1. Structure of confusion matrix for n classes. 
Actual 
Prediction 
𝒄𝟏 𝒄𝟐 ⋯ 𝒄𝒏 
𝑐1 𝑐1,1 𝑐1,2 ⋯ 𝑐1,𝑛 
𝑐2 𝑐2,1 𝑐2,2 ⋯ 𝑐2,𝑛 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ 
𝑐𝑛 𝑐𝑛,1 𝑐𝑛,2 ⋯ 𝑐𝑛,𝑛 
Although this measure was first proposed by Kubat and Matwin [40], few studies have used it 
to assess and compare the performance of different models. However, a number of recent studies in 
network ID domain have started to use it [42–44]. 
5.1. Overview of Classification/Machine Learning Algorithms 
For all of the experiments conducted in this paper, three common classification algorithms that 
are widely used for batch learning were analysed, evaluated and compared to address the anomaly 
network detection. These algorithms were C5.0, Random Forest (RF) and Support Vector Machine 
(SVM); this section provides an overview of each of these algorithms.  
5.1.1. Decision Trees (C5.0) 
C5.0 is a classification algorithm [45] based on decision trees, which are used in classification 
problems to build a deterministic data structure that is formed out of decision rules for a particular 
domain [46]. It has a lower error rate due to its use of ‘boosting’ [47]. Additionally, as C5.0 generates 
smaller trees, it consumes fewer resources, such as memory, and performs faster executions. It also 
avoids overfitting noisy data [48]. The C5.0 algorithm uses the information gain ratio to perform its 
splits, aiming to reduce the bias towards features with a large number of distinct values by penalising 
the selection of a feature based on the number and size of its branches. However, this criterion might 
result in favouring features with very low information values [49]. The final classification decision is 
based on the path traversed from root to leaf; these decisions can be either a ‘class’ (label), or 
‘probabilities’ (score) of classes. 
C5.0 performs tree pruning by removing parts of the tree that are predicted to have a high error 
rate [50]. In this pruning process, every subtree is evaluated to determine whether it will be replaced 
with a leaf or a node.    
5.1.2. Random Forest (RF) 
Random Forest (RF) is basically formed out of multiple decision trees (prediction models) that 
are grown using a combination of ‘bagging’ and the random selection of features (subspace). Bagging 
(bootstrap aggregating) is a technique that aims to improve the performance (accuracy and stability) 
of ML algorithms and to reduce variances and the chance of overfitting [51,52]. This is performed by 
generating nTree bootstrap samples, which are randomly sampled from the main training data. Each 
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of these bootstraps will then be used to build a prediction model, resulting in a total of nTree models 
(decision trees).  
After a bootstrap sample is produced, a decision tree is generated. In RF, only a random selection 
of features (subspace), with no replacement, are evaluated at every node to decide on the best split, 
rather than using the full features set as in the C5.0 algorithm. The number of these random features, 
mtry, is usually far less than the original number of features. 
Out-of-bag (OOB) data are used in the internals of RF to estimate and monitor the errors of the 
decision tree and its strength, as well as the correlation between different trees and to measure feature 
importance [46,53].  
The final prediction of the forest is performed by running each instance down all decision trees 
in the forest. The results of all these trees are then aggregated to form the final decision. For numerical 
predictions, the average or the weighted average of the results of all trees is returned, whereas for 
classification problems, the majority vote or the probability of the classes is returned.  
The RF algorithm has many advantages, such as low training time complexity and fast 
prediction time [54,55], efficient handling of missing data, no required pre-processing (scaling or 
normalisation) of data, and efficient handling of imbalanced data and rare cases (due to the 
bootstrapping feature) [56]. However, this algorithm has some drawbacks, such as slow runtime as 
the number of its trees increase, and difficulty to interpret its models due to their high complexity 
(caused by randomisation) [57]. The key stages of the RF algorithm are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Main phases of Random Forest algorithm. 
5.1.3. Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
The Support Vector Machine (SVM) [58] is one of the most popular classification algorithms 
used for supervised learning tasks in ML. Its development is based on the structural risk 
minimisation principle [57,59]. In SVM, each data instance is represented geometrically as a vector 
(ℛ𝑝 ) in p-dimensional space—𝑥 = (𝑥1, ⋯ , 𝑥𝑝) ∈ Χ ⊂ ℛ
𝑝 . SVM attempts to find a linear surface 
(hyperplane)—or a line in 2D space—that separates the instances into two classes y ∈ {–1, 1}, where 
this separating hyperplane has the largest distance between the edge points of each class. These edge 
points define the border lines for each class as per Equation 2:   
𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 (−) 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,      | 𝑤. 𝑥 + 𝑏 = −1 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  (+) 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,      | 𝑤. 𝑥 + 𝑏 = +1 
(2) 
where x is an edge point in the training data that lies on the border line of a class, and b is (offset) the 
distance from the origin to the decision boundary (𝑤. 𝑥 + 𝑏 = 0) [58]. The edge points also define 
the width of the margin between those border lines. These points (vectors) are used to define and 
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outline (support) the separating hyperplane and are called the support vectors. The minimum 
number required of these points is (p + 1).  
As there could be many separating hyperplanes that might separate positive cases from negative 
cases, the SVM algorithm searches for a decision boundary with the maximum margin. The width of 
this margin is the sum of the distances from that decision boundary to the parallel hyperplanes that 
contain the closest positive and negative training points (support vectors) [60]. 
The SVM classifier depends on computing w, which is a normal vector perpendicular to the 
separating hyperplane (decision boundary). This normal vector is precomputed as Equation 3 
presents: 
𝑤 = ∑𝜆𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (3) 
where 𝜆𝑖  are Lagrange multipliers produced at the training phase using data with N training 
samples. SVM classification is performed by evaluating which side of the hyperplane a test instance 
(vector) will fall into, as Equation 4 shows:   
𝑆𝑉𝑀(?̂?) = {
−1,    𝑤. ?̂? + 𝑏 < 0
+1,    𝑤. ?̂? + 𝑏 ≥ 0
 (4) 
where ?̂? is a test instance, and b is (offset) the distance from the origin to the decision boundary 
(𝑤. 𝑥 + 𝑏 = 0) [58], which is precomputed at the training phase. 
SVM has the capability to find a separating hyperplane with soft margins, which allows some 
violation of the boundary by permitting some levels of mixing between classes. This is usually done 
by tuning some cost value (C), which has an effect on the variance [61]. 
One of the main advantages of SVM is that it does not suffer from the “curse of dimensionality,” 
as many other ML algorithms do. As a result, feature reduction is not required by SVM [62]. SVM 
also has many limitations, such as the required pre-processing phase of the data (dealing with 
missing data, data transformation, scaling and/or normalisation) [63].   
For non-linearly separable problems, SVM might require the use of kernel methods or functions 
to transform the data from input (data) space into higher dimensional (feature) space, where the data 
can be made linearly separable. Hence, the resultant separating hyperplane can be expressed using 
the inner products of the vectors [64]. However, using kernels will incur optimisation costs, as all 
their tuning parameters need to be taken into account [65]. As a result, SVM processing speed is 
affected by the kernel used, as some kernels will perform more operations in the transformation 
phase, which will slow the SVM’s speed [66]. 
5.2. Parameter setting for the ML algorithms 
All of the implementations of the analysed algorithms within this study utilized packages of the 
R environment [67]. Default parameters of these algorithms were used to make these experiments 
reproducible. Adjusting parameters to improve detection would require further investigation, which 
is outside the scope of this paper. 
5.2.1. C5.0 algorithm 
The “c50” package (version 0.1.0-24) [68] was used in this study. All experiments used the 
default settings of this algorithm, with the 10 trials option (trials = 10) set to return the results of the 
classification as a probability score (type = "prob") when the model was used to predict the evaluation 
(test) data.  
5.2.2. Random Forest 
The “ranger” package (version 0.8.0) [69,70] was used over the course of this research. This 
package was selected because of its fast implementation of RF in C++. All experiments used the 
default settings of 500 trees (nTree) to grow, with the number of features to evaluate at every node 
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being the square root of the total number of features in the dataset (𝑚𝑡𝑟𝑦 = ⌊√𝑝⌋), where p is the 
number of features. The algorithm was instructed to return results in the form of classification 
probabilities (probability = TRUE).  
5.2.3. Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
The open source SVM package (LiblineaR) (version 2.10-8) [71,72] was used in these 
experiments. This package executes an optimized linear version of SVM. All experiments used the 
default settings of L2-regularized logistic regression linear model type (type = 0) with the cost set to 
one (cost = 1).  
The choice to use the linear version of SVM was driven by the very large differences in the 
runtime of experiments between its linear and nonlinear kernel versions. Some preliminary 
experimentations were conducted to compare the two versions. As a result of the large difference of 
runtime between the two versions, the linear version of SVM was selected, as it was much faster. 
These preliminary experiments also showed that the runtime of the kernel SVM grows exponentially 
as the number of instances increase. With all these differences, the nonlinear kernel SVM was not 
tractable to be introduced as a solution in a domain like IDS [73]. 
Data were pre-processed by converting all categorical (nominal) features into dummy attributes, 
as SVM can only handle numerical data [74]. A data were also standardised, where the 
standardisation parameters (the mean and standard deviation) of the training data were used to 
standardise the features of the test data before being classified by the model [71,75].  
5.3. Performance assessment techniques 
K-folds cross-validation (CV) technique is the most widely used performance assessment 
method of different ML algorithms due to many reasons, such as data shortage [76–78], avoiding 
overfitting problems [79], and to identify and fine tune the model’s parameters [80]. In this technique, 
the dataset is randomly divided into K parts. A model is then trained using K-1 parts and tested on 
the remaining part. This process is repeated K times, so that each one of the K parts is only used once 
as test data. The model’s overall performance is estimated by aggregating the performance of the K 
models (through averaging or a majority vote). However, it requires a long time to process as larger 
values of K are used. It could also provide overly optimistic results due to the random division of 
datasets, which could be a result of partitions that are statistically similar to each other. Therefore, 
the K-folds CV technique was used in all experiments at every model building (training) stage to 
estimate the prediction thresholds for every developed model, as per the recommendation of 
Ambroise and McLachlan [81]. 
In this paper we adopted the prospective sampling [82] method, which obtains new sample data 
after the model generation phase is over. This method is not a commonly used evaluation practice in 
anomaly-based detection. This evaluation method aimed to mirror real life, given that models are 
usually trained on data that have been collected in the past to predict future data. 
5.4. Datasets description 
This section provides an overview of the datasets used in the experiments outlined in this study. 
Two synthetic datasets (SEA and AGR) were generated randomly, alongside two domain specific 
datasets (gureKDD and STA2018). The first three datasets (SEA, AGR and gureKDD) were used in 
the first experiment, and STA2018 in the second one. 
5.4.1. SEA 
A streaming ensemble algorithm (SEA) generator [83] in the MOA framework [31] was used to 
generate a data stream with three continuous features (X1, X2, X3). Each feature had a range between 
0 and 10, although only features X1 and X2 influenced the class value. Instances were produced by 
randomly generating points (X1, X2) in a two dimensional space. Instances were labelled as groupA if 
X1 + X2 > θ, and as groupB if X1 + X2 ≤ θ, where X1 and X2 were the first two features and θ was a 
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threshold. There were four functions, which would label the instances differently based on their 
threshold values between the two classes (function 1 sets θ = 8, function 2 uses θ = 9, function 3 sets 
θ = 7, and function 4 sets θ = 9.5) [84]. The SEA generator’s default setting was used to add 10% noise 
classes. Six different data streams (files) were produced: function 1 was used to generate two streams 
(file 1 and file 2); function 2 was used to generate two other streams (file 3 and file 4); and a 
combination of function 1 and function 2 was used to generate two streams (file 5 and file 6). For 
every file, calls to these functions used different seed values to set the seed of the random generator 
function to generate new random instances. Figure 2 presents an example of the command line call 
to generate File 1 with the SEA stream generator. 
 
Figure 2. Command used to generate File 1 of streaming ensemble algorithm (SEA) dataset. 
Each stream consisted of 200,000 instances. This dataset was used to analyse the effect of 
different statistical properties (concept drift) between training and testing data on the model’s 
performance. Table 2 lists the number of instances of each class in every file in this dataset. 
Table 2. Instances’ classes in every file in the SEA dataset. 
 File 1 File 2 File 3 File 4 File 5 File 6 Total 
groupA 71,609 71,298 85,190 84,965 78,295 77,913 469,270 
groupB 128,391 128,702 114,810 115,035 121,705 122,087 730,730 
5.4.2. AGR 
The AGRAWAL generator [85] in the MOA framework [31] was used to generate a data stream 
with nine features (X1, …, X9), six of which were nominal (factor) and three of which were continuous. 
This generator had ten different functions to assign the produced instances to one of two different 
classes, based on the values of their different features. The following examples illustrate the labelling 
rules of the two functions that were used in generating this dataset: 
Function 1: - if (age < 40 OR age ≥ 60) then groupA else groupB ,  
Function 2: - if (age < 40){      if (50K ≤ salary ≤ 100K) then groupA else groupB }, 
- else if (age < 60){ if (75K ≤ salary ≤ 125K) then groupA else groupB }, 
- else{               if (25K ≤ salary ≤ 75K)  then groupA else groupB }, 
Each function increases the level of complexity as it uses additional features and complex rules 
to label the instances [86]. The generator’s default setting was used to add 10% noise classes by 
introducing a disturbance factor that added a deviation value (following uniform random 
distribution) to the original feature’s values. Similar to the SEA dataset generation, six different data 
streams (each with 200,000 instances) were generated using function 1 and function 2 of the AGR 
data stream generator. Figure 3 provides an example of the command line used to generate the data 
of File 1 in this dataset. Table 3 presents a summary of the label frequencies in every file for this 
dataset.  
 
java -cp moa.jar -javaagent:sizeofag-1.0.0.jar moa.DoTask  
    "WriteStreamToARFFFile -m 200000 -f f1.arff  -s (generators.SEAGenerator -f 1 -i 1)" 
 
WriteStreamToARFFFile Parameters: 
   -m : "Maximum number of instances to write to file." 
   -f : "Destination ARFF file name." 
   -s : "Stream to write." 
 
generators.SEAGenerator Parameters: 
   -f : "Classification function used to assign instances with class labels." 
   -i : "Seed for random generation of instances." 
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Table 3. Instances’ classes in every file in the AGR dataset. 
 File 1 File 2 File 3 File 4 File 5 File 6 Total 
groupA 134,572 134,457 76,577 76,947 105,301 105,785 633,639 
groupB 65,428 65,543 123,423 123,053 94,699 94,215 566,361 
 
Figure 3. Command used to generate File 1 of AGR dataset. 
5.4.3. gureKDDcup 
gureKDDcup [87–89] (referred to throughout this paper as gureKDD) is a transformation of the 
raw network traffic of the DARPA 1998 dataset [90] into a suitable format for ML tasks, where every 
connection is described using a set of features. This transformation is similar to the KDD 1999 
dataset [91], but much richer and cleaner. The KDD 1999 dataset was not used in this paper due to its 
many limitations, identified by Al Tobi and Duncan [92]. Every connection in the gureKDD dataset 
has a unique ID that helps identify the chronological order of all connections. Therefore, all 
connections in this dataset are chronologically separable and can be divided by day, week, etc.  
For the first experiments, all traffic (over a seven week period) was segregated into a time 
window of a week, which resulted in seven files. Every file contained the network traffic of that week 
(Monday–Friday). Every connection in these files was profiled using 41 features: 3 of which were 
nominal (protocol_type, service and flag), 6 were binary features, 15 were continuous (real) features and 
17 were integer features. These features were divided into four main groups: intrinsic (basic) features 
{1–9}, content based features {10–22}, time based features {23–31} and connection based features {32-
41}.   
Each connection was labelled either as normal or as one of the 35 different attacks. These attacks 
were grouped into four main classes: DOS, Probing, Remote to Local or User to Root. In these 
experiments, the data were pre-processed so all different attack types were grouped and labelled as 
‘attack’ to produce binary classes. Table 4 presents a statistical summary of the connection class types 
for each of the seven weeks, which were clearly shown to have different class balances. 
Table 4. Number of connection classes in every file in the gureKDD dataset. 
 Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Week 7 Total 
Normal 177,889 186,706 72,676 98,627 128,516 247,699 217,743 1,129,856 
Attack 21 2,084 215,693 15,319 475,787 703,662 217,072 1,629,638 
DOS 16 1,002 207,896 1,171 465,825 684,741 207,035 1,567,686 
PROBE 0 1,027 7,757 12,366 9,941 18,017 10,031 59,139 
R2L 1 55 39 1,752 0 881 2 2,730 
U2R 4 0 1 30 21 14 4 74 
Anomaly 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 9 
Total 177,910 188,790 288,369 113,946 604,303 951,361 434,815 2,759,494 
  
java -cp moa.jar -javaagent:sizeofag-1.0.0.jar moa.DoTask  
    "WriteStreamToARFFFile -m 200000 -f f1.arff  -s (generators.AgrawalGenerator -f 1 -i 1)" 
 
WriteStreamToARFFFile Parameters: 
   -m : "Maximum number of instances to write to file." 
   -f : "Destination ARFF file name." 
   -s : "Stream to write." 
 
generators.SEAGenerator Parameters: 
   -f : "Classification function used to assign instances with class labels." 
   -i : "Seed for random generation of instances." 
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5.4.4. STA2018 
The STA2018 dataset (The full data set can be found at: https://doi.org/10.17630/c5f31888-9db5-
4ac0-a990-3fd17dcfe865) [73] was generated by transforming the network traffic of the UNB ISCX 
Intrusion Detection Evaluation DataSet 2012 [93] into a suitable format for ML tasks. This dataset 
profiles every connection using 193 basic features, where part of Onut’s feature classification schema 
[94] was used to extend these features to a total of 550 features (549 independent variables plus 1 
dependent (class) variable).  
The STA2018 dataset contains the profiled sessions (connections) of the network traffic of seven 
simulation days, where data records are grouped by day so that every data file aggregated all of the 
connections within that simulation day. The transformation process of this dataset went into five 
main stages: basic features extraction, validation and connection labelling, extend the basic features, balance 
and clean up. 
Due to the balancing stage, this dataset can be used into two modes: first with the original 
imbalanced version, second with a balanced version where synthetic instances of the attack 
connections (minority class) were generated using the Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique 
(SMOTE) algorithm [95]. Table 5 sets out the number of connections for each class for each day 
(original and balanced versions). 
Table 5. Number of classes of instances for each day’s file of the STA2018 dataset. 
 
Day 1 
11/Jun 
Day 2 
12/Jun 
Day 3 
13/Jun 
Day 4 
14/Jun 
Day 5 
15/Jun 
Day 6 
16/Jun 
Day 7 
17/Jun 
Total 
Normal 442,705 164,545 168,947 213,798 633,388 600,017 409,090 2,632,490 
Attack 0 2,123 10,037 6,422 35,260 11 4,959 58,812 
Total (Original) 442,705 166,668 178,984 220,220 668,648 600,028 414,049 2,691,302 
Synthetic 0 162,422 158,910 207,376 598,128 600,006 404,131 2,130,973 
Total (Balanced) 442,705 329,090 337,894 427,596 1,266,776 1,200,034 818,180 4,822,275 
In the second set of experiments outlined in section 7, only days 2 to 7 were used, as the first day 
was attack free. 
Originally, the file for each day consisted of 550 features (549 features + 1 class). Two features 
(synthetic and origOrder) were omitted from any analysis, as their only purpose was to distinguish the 
original data from the balanced (synthetic) data and to identify the connection order. Three further 
features were removed from the analysis (start_time, src_ip and dst_ip), both to avoid any possibility of 
overfitting and because of the large number of levels. Removing these five features resulted in a total 
of 545 features (544 features + 1 class). Any reference to the Full set of features thus refers to these 545 
features.  
5.6. Hardware Specifications 
All experiments were performed on a “Dell C5220 PowerEdge Rack Servers” cluster, which had 
12 micro servers. Each micro server ran Scientific Linux 7 on dual quad-core Intel Xeon 3.4GHz CPUs, 
16GB RAM, two 500GB SATA disks and two Gigabit Ethernet interfaces. The large data files of the 
STA2018 dataset {Day 5 (15/Jun) and Day 6 (16/Jun)}, in the second set of experiments, were run on a 
Hyper-V virtual machine with 8 Virtual Processors, 20 GB RAM and 32 GB Swap space. This VM was 
used to host the Ubuntu 16.04 (64-bit) operating system. It was hosted on a server with the following 
hardware specifications: 2U Supermicro chassis; 8x host-swap 2.5" SAS/SATA disk bays; Supermicro 
X8DTU-LN4F+ motherboard; Dual Intel Xeon E5620 (quad core); 24GB RAM (6 x 4GB DDR3 ECC 
RDIMM); 4x 1TB SATA (RAID10); and 4x 1Gb Ethernet. This machine used a Windows Server 2012 
R2 Datacentre (64-bit) operating system. 
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6. First Experiment 
In the first set of experiments, we examined the effect of threshold adaptation on the overall 
performance of a detection model. We aimed to provide a proof of concept (PoC) by comparing three 
well known ML algorithms (C5.0, RF and SVM) to determine which was the most adaptable to 
variations and concept drifts. In this set of experiments, we conducted two different experimental 
setups (see Figure 4). Both setups used the same datasets and the same ML algorithms, however, 
different sampling approaches were performed. We analysed the effect of different sampling 
approaches on individual detection model accuracy using a real life setup (prospective sampling), 
and compared this to the usual experimental setups reported in academic publications (K-folds cross-
validation). Another part of this experiment was to examine the effect of threshold adaptation in 
improving model overall detection accuracy. The choice to use the synthetic datasets (SEA and AGR) 
was driven by the need to control the degree of variability between different data files. The gureKDD 
dataset was used to make this study comparable to other studies in the field, as its comparator 
datasets (KDD1999 and NSL-KDD) are widely used in this domain.  
 
Figure 4. The phase diagram of the experiments. 
6.1. Results and discussion 
This section presents the results of the first set of experiments and discusses their main findings. 
6.1.1. 10-folds Cross-validation on Full Data 
In the first setup (Figure 4), we started these experiments by comparing the detection 
performances of the three ML algorithms (C5.0, RF and SVM) on the three different datasets 
(gureKDD, SEA and AGR). The conventional method of 10-folds CV technique was performed on the 
merged files of each dataset. The maximum gAccs of these models and the best cut-off values were 
reported. Due to the minimal variability between results, each experiment was repeated only ten 
times (see Table 6). 
Table 6 presents the average of the gAcc values of the ten trials of the 10-folds CV in terms of the 
gAcc of the three algorithms (C5.0, RF and SVM). It also shows the mean of the optimal cut-off values 
of the ten runs at which the maximum gAccs were reached. 
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In general, all algorithms reported similar accuracies for their respective datasets. However, in 
the artificial dataset AGR, SVM failed to perform anywhere close to C5.0 or RF (showing a difference 
of almost 15%—see Table 5). This could be related to the nature of the dataset, which could be non-
linearly separable, as a linear version of SVM was used in this analysis. Generally, RF was capable of 
improving detection accuracy on all datasets.   
Generally, the performance of all algorithms on gureKDD was the highest, followed by those on 
the SEA dataset. The AGR dataset was the worst in reaching high detection accuracy. This fact is 
clearly illustrated by the plots in Figure 5, which show the gAcc curve against the cut-off values for 
all datasets. These plots show the ten runs in a lighter colour and the means of these runs in solid 
colour. They also show the optimal threshold values for each dataset under the tested algorithm.   
Table 6. Average model accuracy (G-mean accuracy), the average optimal cut-off value (at which 
maximum G-mean accuracy was reached) and their standard deviation of the 10-folds cross-
validation (10 repetitions). 
 
C5.0 RF SVM 
G-Mean Accuracy Optimal Cutoff G-Mean Accuracy Optimal Cutoff G-Mean Accuracy Optimal Cutoff 
gureKDD 0.9998 ±0.0000 0.5322 ±0.0122 0.9998 ±0.0000 0.4714 ±0.0126 0.9947 ±0.0000 0.5879 ±0.0022 
SEA 0.8568 ±0.0002 0.2959 ±0.0070 0.8951 ±0.0002 0.2329 ±0.0011 0.8621 ±0.0000 0.4354 ±0.0001 
AGR 0.7162 ±0.0003 0.5322 ±0.0044 0.6580 ±0.0001 0.7700 ±0.0011 0.5627 ±0.0000 0.5144 ±0.0002 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 5. The gAcc curves of the 10 runs of the 10-folds cross-validation experiments for the three 
datasets (gureKDD, SEA and AGR) using three classification algorithms. (a) C5.0. (b) Random Forest. 
(c) SVM. 
Friedman’s test [96,97] was used to analyse whether the differences between the accuracies of 
all runs of the 10-folds CV on the full datasets for these algorithms were significant. The tested 
hypothesis was, “there is no statistically significant difference in model gAccs between the different 
algorithms.” This test revealed that there was a significant difference between the different algorithms 
applied to these datasets under the 10-folds CV approaches, χ2(2) = 26.7, p = 0.000 < 0.05. The follow 
up Nemenyi post-hoc test [98] revealed that the algorithms were all different from each other, as 
illustrated in Figure 6, which shows that the differences between the algorithms were statistically 
significant. 
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Figure 6. Critical differences plot of the pairwise Nemenyi comparison test for the full datasets 10-
folds cross-validation experiment. 
6.1.2. Subset-to-Subset (File-to-File) 
In the second setup (Figure 4), we used the same datasets and algorithms to generate detection 
models, but in scenarios that were similar to natural settings we applied the prospective sampling 
technique [82]. In these experiments, models were generated on a subset of the dataset using the 10-
folds CV technique to set these models’ parameters, i.e., the prediction threshold (cut-off). These 
models were then used to evaluate the remaining files in the dataset. Two gAcc values were 
computed for every combination of prediction model and evaluation data. The first gAcc was 
obtained when the model’s pre-set prediction threshold value, which was calculated using the 10-
folds cross-validation, was used to predict the test data file. The second gAcc value was calculated 
based on the maximum accuracy reached when the prediction threshold value was adapted to the 
evaluated data file. This section shows the results obtained under this setup.  
Plots of the gAcc (in Figure A1, Figure A2 and Figure A3 in Appendix A) present the 
performance of the prediction model (MDLk) that was trained using Filek on the files in the dataset 
(Filei≠k) that were not used in producing that model. In these figures, each model’s performance, based 
on the CV technique, is illustrated with a solid line; other individual performance evaluations are 
depicted with dotted lines. As the SEA and AGR datasets are composed of only six files each, there 
is no illustration of model 7 for these datasets in these figures.   
C5.0 algorithm: 
Algorithm C5.0 had the worst performance on the first file in the gureKDD dataset, even at CV 
evaluation during the model generation stage (Figure A1 in Appendix A). This is due to the fact that 
this file has the least number of attacks (21 attacks) and is the most imbalanced of the files. Therefore, 
the generated model using this file was not able to predict any instances in other files. Where the 
number of attacks in other files increased with a proportionate balance, the model performances 
improved under this algorithm.  
Generally, applying this algorithm under the prospective sampling approach followed the same 
pattern as the first experiment (10-folds cross-validation), where performance on gureKDD resulted 
in the highest accuracy, followed by the SEA dataset; the worst performing dataset was the AGR. 
For both the SEA and AGR datasets, the generated models performed best when files exhibited 
the same statistical properties, denoted in these experiments by the same generating functions. For 
example, where MDL1 used File 1 as training data, it predicted instances in File 2 with a high 
performance and vice versa, as both files were generated using the same function. This was also true 
for Files 3 and 4. Where files contained mixed behaviours, the prediction performance dropped 
sharply.   
Table A1, Table A2 and Table A3—in Appendix A—present the results of each model on every 
file generated by each of the different algorithms. These tables show that the performance of all of 
these models improved when the threshold (cut-off) was adapted for the evaluation dataset, rather 
than using a pre-calculated one.  
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Random Forest (RF) algorithm: 
Unlike C5.0, it was expected that RF would perform well on the first file of the gureKDD dataset 
despite its low number of attack connections. This was linked to the bootstrap stage, where instances 
were sampled from the population with replacement. This means that duplicates of the 21 attack 
connections were sampled many times, which increased the predictability of the built trees (Figure 
A2 in Appendix A).  
After careful examination of the results, as presented by Table A2 in Appendix A, one can see, 
especially in the synthetic data (SEA and AGR), that when a testing file has similar statistical 
properties to the model, its performance will not increase much, even after cut-off adaptation. 
However, when it has different statistical properties, the adaptation process boosts the prediction, 
leading to an accurate evaluation of a model’s performance.  
Furthermore, the effect of the adaptation process was more tangible in gureKDD than in the 
synthetic data, as this dataset exhibited both different patterns and varying statistical properties 
between files. For example, Table A2—in Appendix A—under gureKDD data, shows that MDL1, 
which was trained on File 1, reached a gAcc of 67.33% on File 5 when the original cut-off (threshold) 
of the model was used, but applying the adaptation process to this threshold increased its 
performance to 99.37%.  
SVM algorithm: 
SVM performed the worst on the AGR dataset in comparison to the other algorithms (Figure A3 
in Appendix A). This could have been the result of the non-linear nature of this dataset, which was 
not picked up by the SVM linear implementation used in these experiments. In general, the cut-off 
(threshold) adaptation showed a similar effect in improving the models’ performances compared to 
using the model’s optimal threshold.  
6.2. Discussion 
The findings of the experiments in this section illustrate the importance of the adapted cut-off 
value to the data–model pairs in achieving an accurate reading of each model’s performance. 
Friedman’s test [96,97] was used to assess whether the difference between the different algorithms 
was significant before and after threshold adaptation. The tested hypothesis was, “there is no 
statistically significant difference in model gAccs before and after cut-off (threshold) adaptation 
between the different algorithms.” This test revealed that there was a significant difference between 
the different algorithms before and after threshold adaptation, χ2(5) = 217.7, p = 0.000 < 0.05.   
To identify which algorithms were different, a Nemenyi post-hoc test was carried out to 
calculate the pairwise comparisons. Figure 7 presents the critical differences between the different 
algorithms before and after cut-off adaptation as a plot. The plot shows that when the cut-off was 
adapted for the evaluated dataset, the SVM and C5.0 algorithms were no different to each other. They 
showed the same behaviour even when cut-off adaptation was not performed, but the cut-off 
adaptation increased their gAccs. In general, all algorithms were ranked higher when cut-off 
adaptation was performed, with the RF algorithm always outperforming the other two.  
7. Second Experiment 
In this set of experiments, we used the STA2018 dataset to investigate the capability of various 
ML algorithms in adapting their predictions to the variability of network traffic. We investigated this 
new approach (prediction threshold adaptation) in the IDS domain.  
Typical model development would be governed by decisions made to improve some 
performance measures, e.g., speed or detection rate. Such decisions, which might involve executing 
a feature selection and/or a data balancing stage, are usually based on the analysis that will be 
conducted on the training data. As such, when new evaluation data are used, the performance of the 
models may not be satisfactory, leading to a phasing out of those models and the generation of new 
ones. However, such models may still be able to maintain high performances if they are adapted to 
the new concept that is introduced in the new data.  
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Figure 7. Critical differences plot of the pairwise Nemenyi comparison test for the cut-off (threshold) 
adaptation experiment. 
There are many techniques to perform feature selection, which aims to select a subset of salient 
features to build a prediction model. Bi et al. [99] have attempted feature selection through 
introducing a probe to the data by adding three randomly generated variables (fake 
features/columns) to the dataset. These fake features are randomly drawn from a Gaussian 
distribution [100]. They use a linear SVM to model the subsets at every iteration of a K-folds cross-
validation, where variables with nonzero weights are selected. Any variable (feature) with an average 
weight below that of the fake variables is then rejected. This approach does not address weight 
variability, as it only compares averages.  
Similarly, Kursa et al. [101,102] have proposed a similar approach in which the information 
system (training data) is doubled, so that every feature has a shadow feature that is basically a 
shuffled version of the original one. Feature importance evaluation is then performed on the extended 
system using the RF algorithm. A K-folds CV—of at least 10-folds—is performed at every iteration, 
so that every feature is compared to its shadow using statistical tests to evaluate the highest 
performing features. The main drawbacks of this approach are scalability and speed. Therefore, in 
this paper a new approach has been proposed and executed that combines the core ideas of the two 
approaches above.  
In this approach, as illustrated in Figure 8, the information system (training data) is extended by 
adding three randomly generated variables (fake features/columns) to the dataset, where these fake 
variables are drawn randomly from a Gaussian distribution. A feature importance evaluation—using 
the RF algorithm—was performed on the newly extended system, and the importance measures of 
these random variables were then used as a threshold to reject any features with a lower importance 
value than those of the fake variables. In other words, any feature that performed worse than a 
random guess was rejected. This comparison was performed using statistical measures. 
 
Figure 8. Critical differences plot of the pairwise Nemenyi comparison test for the cut-off (threshold) 
adaptation experiment. 
As equal variance between compared groups (feature versus fake variables) is not guaranteed, 
and due to the unbalanced design (number of compared importance measures) of these comparisons, 
which would have small sample sizes, Welch’s two sample t-test [103,104] was used. Comparisons 
were performed to evaluate the statistical significance of the mean difference between every feature 
and the fake variables. The aim of this approach was to speed up the feature selection stage and to 
make it independent of human evaluation or fixed thresholds, so that it would be more adaptive to 
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the true nature of the dataset. This study adapts the approach of Bi et al. [99] to address the limitation 
of the Kursa et al. [101] method. 
Every fake feature was formed of N random values drawn from a Gaussian distribution with a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, where N was the number of records in the training 
data. These random features were combined with the original dataset and were processed by the RF 
algorithm to compute its features’ importance, using a 3-folds CV technique. A Welch’s t-test 
statistical [103,104] comparison was then performed to evaluate whether the mean of the importance 
measures of every feature, Fi,—from the three folds—was statistically significantly greater than the 
mean importance of the fake features (with a significance level of α = 0.05). All features with a mean 
importance statistically significantly greater than that of the fake features were selected. The steps of 
the feature selection stage are illustrated in Algorithm 1.  
As RF can return importance score of every feature, it has been used to select the salient features 
using its two measures {mean decrease of accuracy (MDA) and mean decrease in Gini (MDG)} 
[70,105].   
Algorithm 1: Feature Selection with Fake Features (pseudo code) 
Input: dataFile,   ftrType     
Result: Selected Important Features  
1 dataFile <- filename,                     // Name of the data file to be processed 
2 ftrType  <- ftrMsr,                       // Features importance measure {MDA or MDG} 
3  
4 ftrImprtance <- {},                       // Initialize list to contain the computed  
5                                           // importance value of every feature 
6 ftrSelected  <- {},                       // Initialize list to contain the selected features 
7  
8 DS     <- load file (fileName),           // Load the content of the data file 
9 ftrSet <- getDataFeatures(DS),            // Get the list of features in the data file 
10 N      <- num_rows(DS),                   // Get number of records in the training data 
11  
12 𝐹𝐾1 <- rand(sample=N, mean=0, sd=1),     // Generate 3 lists of random variables where 
13 𝐹𝐾2 <- rand(sample=N, mean=0, sd=1),     // each list contains N random numbers with  
14 𝐹𝐾3 <- rand(sample=N, mean=0, sd=1),     // mean=0 and standard deviation=1 
15  
16  
17 newDS <- [ 𝐷𝑆(𝑁×𝑝)  𝐹𝐾(𝑁×1)
1   𝐹𝐾(𝑁×1)
2   𝐹𝐾(𝑁×1)
3  ],  // Append the fake features to the original data 
18 partsDS <- create K partitions of newDS, // Create K partitions to calculate features  
19                                          // importance measures using K-folds Cross-Validation 
20  
21 // Compute the importance of every feature using K-folds 
22 // Cross-Validation and save them in ftrImprtance 
23 For fold  in  K-folds, do  
24    trainRcrds <- partsDS[-c(fold)] 
25    ftrImprtance[fold, ] <- featre_importance(data=newDS[trainRcrds, ], measure=ftrMsr) 
26 done 
27  
28 // Evaluate every feature in the data file by comparing its performance 
29 // to the performances of the 3 fake features. If the mean importance of 
30 // that feature is statistically higher than the mean importance of the 
31 // fake features, then add that feature to the selection set.  
32 For Fi in ftrSet, do  
33    if( ftrImprtance[,Fi] > ftrImprtance[,c(𝐹𝐾1, 𝐹𝐾2, 𝐹𝐾3)] with t.test probability > 0.05 ){ 
34       ftrSelected <- ftrSelected ∪ {Fi}, 
35    } 
36  
37 done 
38  
39 return( ftrSelected ),            // Return the list of selected features 
  
In the feature importance evaluation, 15 categorical (factor) features were eliminated from the 
STA2018 dataset, as they had been added to all the experiments’ model building designs and 
evaluation process by default. These features are listed in Table 7. 
The experiments were executed in three different phases, as explained below, and presented 
with the pseudo code in Algorithm 2. 
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Table 7. Categorical (factor) features eliminated from the feature importance evaluation phase. 
No. Feature 
2 src_ip 
3 src_zone 
5 dst_ip 
6 dst_zone 
9 ipVersion 
10 Protocol 
11 conn_state 
23 bro_conn_state 
24 bro_service 
31 conn_start 
32 conn_partial_start 
33 conn_close 
34 conn_partial_close 
43 conn_stats_orig_endian_type 
50 conn_stats_resp_endian_type 
 
 
Algorithm 2: Experiment Phases (pseudo code) 
Input: Dataset       
Result: Performance results  
1 For Fi in Dataset, do             // Process every file Fi in the STA2018 dataset 
2    Ftrs.Set[Full] <- {Full.Ftrs}  // 544 features 
3    Mdls.Set <- {} 
4    Rslt.Set <- {} 
5  
6    Fi.bal <- Balance(Fi)    // Generate/get a balanced version of data file Fi with balanced 
7                            // instances’ classes by generating synthetic instances of 
8                            // minority class using SMOTE algorithm. 
9  
10  // Phase 1: features selection... 
11    Ftrs.Set[MDA]    <-   getImportantFtrs(data=Fi,     ftrType=MDA) , 
12    Ftrs.Set[MDG]    <-   getImportantFtrs(data=Fi,     ftrType=MDG) , 
13    Ftrs.Set[MDABal.]  <-   getImportantFtrs(data=Fi.bal, ftrType=MDA) , 
14    Ftrs.Set[MDGBal.]  <-   getImportantFtrs(data=Fi.bal, ftrType=MDG) , 
15  
16  // Phase 2: models generation... 
17    // Generate five predictive models using original data with five different sets of features. 
18    For ftrsa in Ftrs.Set, do 
19       Mdls.Set[Fi, ftrsa] <- generate.Model(data=Fi, features= ftrsa) 
20    done 
21  
22    // Generate five predictive models using balanced data with five different sets of features. 
23    For ftrsa in Ftrs.Set, do 
24       Mdls.Set[Fi.bal, ftrsa] <- generate.Model(data=Fi.bal, features= ftrsa) 
25    done 
26  
27  // Phase 3: models evaluation... 
28    // Perform total of 50 evaluations (5 testing files X 10 predictive models) 
29    For Fj≠Fi in Dataset, do 
30       // Test every file other than Fi on every one of the 10 prediction models  
31       // trained on Fi or Fi.bal  
32       For Mdlb in Mdls.Set, do 
33          // Get the following results: 
34          //    1) G-Mean Accuracy using model’s cutoff (threshold) value, 
35          //    2) G-Mean Accuracy using adapted cutoff (threshold) value, 
36          Rslt.Set[Fj, Mdlb] <- evaluate(data=Fj, model=Mdlb) 
37       done 
38    done 
39  
40 done 
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As the STA2018 dataset distinguishes between original and synthetic records, every day’s traffic 
file (subset) was pre-processed in order to be used into two modes [imbalanced and balanced] (line 6 
in Algorithm 2). As explained earlier, the SMOTE algorithm [95] was used by the STA2018 dataset 
[73] to generate synthetic instances of the minority class until the number of instances in both classes 
were equal to each other.   
In the first phase (lines 10–14 in Algorithm 2), every file in the STA2018 dataset (which was used 
to generate the models) was evaluated to select two subsets of features (see Algorithms 1) using the 
Mean Decrease of Accuracy and the Mean Decrease Gini, resulting in the formation of the MDA and 
MDG sets, respectively. The same feature selection criteria were used on the balanced data file to 
generate another two sets of features, referred to in this paper as MDABalanced and MDGBalanced. By the 
end of this phase, there were four feature sets (see Table 8) along with the Full features set for each 
training day.  
In the second phase (lines 16–25 in Algorithm 2), each day’s traffic used each of the five feature 
sets (including the Full features set) to generate a binary classification (prediction) model, which 
resulted in five different models. The same process was repeated using the balanced data. Each model 
generation step used the 3-folds CV technique to establish the model’s optimal (CV) prediction 
threshold. The final prediction threshold was computed by aggregating all the fold’s predictions for 
each model to find the point (threshold) of the maximum gAcc. By the end of this phase, there were 
ten different binary prediction models for each day’s traffic.   
Table 8. Number of selected features under every feature importance measure. 
 Day2 Day3 Day4 Day5 Day6 Day7 
MDA 130 518 364 368 60 355 
MDABalanced 166 507 378 388 170 322 
MDG 124 27 11 113 70 137 
MDGBalanced 119 137 117 168 84 134 
In the final phase (lines 27–38 in Algorithm 2), every generated model was evaluated against 
each day’s traffic from the dataset that had not been used in any of the feature selection, or in the 
model generation processes. In this phase, to test the data file for each evaluation, the gAcc was 
computed using the model’s optimal (CV) threshold and the adapted cut-off.  
The whole process was repeated for each of the algorithms being evaluated: C5.0, RF and SVM. 
7.1. Results and discussion 
As every generated model was evaluated using all of the files (subsets) in the dataset except the 
one that had been used to generate that model, two gAcc values were computed for every 
combination of prediction model and evaluation data. The first gAcc (gAcc𝑇ℎ𝑟𝐶𝑉) was the one obtained 
after the model’s optimal (CV) cut-off value had been calculated using 3-folds CV to predict the data 
file. The other gAcc value (gAcc𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑂𝑝𝑡) was calculated based on the maximum accuracy achieved after 
the prediction cut-off value had been specifically adapted for the evaluated data file. 
As stated earlier, this set of experiments aimed to investigate the effect of the cut-off adaptation 
by determining the statistical significance in the gAcc of the models through comparing their optimal 
threshold with the adaptive cut-off. The analysis compared the difference between the two 
approaches by conducting four Friedman’s tests [96,97] (with a significance level of α = 0.05). The 
decision to use the non-parametric Friedman’s test was based on the fact that the data did not follow 
a normal distribution, as confirmed by the normality test (Shapiro–Wilk test) [106] W = 0.7, p-value = 
0.000. The following list shows the hypotheses that were tested and the results returned by the 
Friedman tests.  
Threshold-H0: “there are no statistically significant differences in model gAccs before and after 
cut-off (threshold) adaptation has been applied.” 
χ2(1) = 873.0, p = 0.000 < 0.05 (differences were statistically significant) 
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ML-H0: “there are no statistically significant differences in model gAccs between the different 
ML algorithms (C5.0, RF and SVM) before and after cut-off (threshold) adaptation has 
been applied.” 
χ2(5) = 747.5, p = 0.000 < 0.05 (differences were statistically significant) 
 
Features-H0: “there are no statistically significant differences in model gAccs between the 
different feature sets (Full, MDA, MDG, MDABal. and MDGBal.) before and after cut-off 
(threshold) adaptation has been applied.” 
χ2(9) = 742.8, p = 0.000 < 0.05 (differences were statistically significant) 
 
Balance-H0: “there are no statistically significant differences in model gAccs between the 
different data balances (Original and Balanced data) before and after cut-off (threshold) 
adaptation has been applied.” 
χ2(3) = 761.3, p = 0.000 < 0.05 (differences were statistically significant) 
As all of these tests showed significant differences, a Nemenyi post-hoc test [107–109] was 
conducted to perform pairwise comparisons on the different effects of each test to distinguish which 
differences were statistically significant. The results of these pairwise comparisons are illustrated in 
Figure 9 through critical difference plots.  
All of the plots in Figure 9 show that the cut-off adaptation effect was significantly different from 
the fixed model’s optimal (CV) threshold. They also show that different treatments (ML algorithm, 
feature sets and/or data balance) with the adaptive cut-off always ranked higher. Any insignificant 
differences fall within the same effect (cut-off adaptation or model’s fixed optimal threshold).  
Having shown that the models’ performance was ranked significantly higher when the adaptive 
cut-off approach was used rather than the fixed optimal (CV) threshold (see results in Table A4, Table 
A5 and Table A6 in Appendix A), all subsequent analyses focus on the results obtained using the 
adaptive cut-off. For every analysed algorithm, a Friedman’s test (with a significance level of α=0.05) 
was performed to test the hypothesis, “there are no statistically significant differences in the gAccs of 
models built with different feature sets and different data balances after a cut-off (threshold) adaptation has been 
applied.” The results of this hypothesis are discussed under every algorithm. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 9. Graphical illustration of pairwise comparisons from the Friedman Test results for different 
threshold effects (optimal or adaptive cut-off) after applying the Nemenyi test (95% confidence level) 
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(a) Fixed vs. adaptive thresholds. (b) ML algorithms under threshold adaptation effect. (c) Feature 
sets under threshold adaptation effect. (d) Training data balances under threshold adaptation effect. 
C5.0 algorithm 
Results in Table A4—in Appendix A—for the C5.0 models show different patterns and 
behaviours from one training day to another. For example, models trained on Day 2 (12/Jun) failed 
to perform well on Day 5 (15/Jun), whereas Day 5 models predicted Day 2 traffic with a high degree 
of accuracy. They also showed inconsistent behaviour towards different feature sets across the days. 
For example, Day 2 models performed best when the Full feature set was used, but this pattern was 
not consistent across all days. This can clearly be seen from the results of Day 5, when MDG features 
were used, and the results of Day 7 (17/Jun) when MDA or MDABal. feature sets were used with the 
balanced training data. One important observation to make is the poor accuracy of Day 6 (16/Jun) 
models when the original training data were used. These models showed the worst accuracy, due to 
the low number of attacks in this data file. When a balanced version of the Day 6 data file was used 
to build the prediction models, accuracy improved. This supports the finding discussed in the 
previous experiments regarding the behaviour of C5.0 algorithm with imbalanced data. It can also 
be clearly observed from these results that data balancing had a minor effect in improving the 
accuracy of models developed using the C5.0 algorithm, which was further investigated using 
statistical analysis.  
The results of Friedman’s test—stated above—revealed that there was not enough evidence to 
support this hypothesis, χ2(9) = 16.0, p = 0.067 ≮ 0.05. These tests showed that there was no significant 
effect of one feature set over another when the C5.0 algorithm was used. In addition, data balancing 
did not lead to a significant improvement in a model’s accuracy. 
Results in Table A4 (see Appendix A) support this conclusion, as the C5.0 models show unstable 
behaviours. Many factors could be behind the volatile behaviour of the C5.0 algorithm. For example, 
selected feature sets might not be the best sets for this algorithm. This algorithm was also executed 
within its default parameters, in particular the number of trials, which was set at ten. In addition, 
C5.0 algorithms carry out random sampling by following the boosting technique (which randomly 
samples weighted instances). This might have caused C5.0 to overfit the training data, which could 
be one of the reasons for its overall poor accuracy in predicting new traffic. Overall, based on the 
statistical results returned using Friedman’s test, the C5.0 models ranked low, as illustrated by 
Figure 9b.   
Random Forest algorithm 
Another Friedman’s test was performed to assess the above hypothesis for the RF algorithm’s 
models. This test aimed to determine how these models performed when using different feature sets 
with different data balances, and whether the difference in accuracy was significant after applying 
the threshold adaptation.  
This test revealed that for the RF algorithm, there were significant differences between these 
features after applying the cut-off (threshold) adaptation, χ2(9) = 38.0, p = 0.000 < 0.05. To distinguish 
which of these effects were statistically significant, a Nemenyi post-hoc test was conducted to 
perform a pairwise comparison, as illustrated in Figure 10. 
Overall, there were no significant differences in the RF’s accuracy when the Full, MDA and 
MDABal. feature sets were used. However, the Full features set showed a significant difference over 
the MDG and MDGBal. feature sets, which ranked lowest among the feature sets. This could be due to 
the nature of the mean decrease Gini metric in selecting local features, which have low generalisation 
power. However, even with these low accuracies, RF had the highest overall accuracy. As Figure 10 
shows, the data balance had no significant effect on the accuracy of RF. On the contrary, it sometimes 
negatively affected the accuracy of models using the Full feature set with balanced data, as their 
difference to the MDG and MDGBal. feature sets became insignificant. This was also evident in the 
results of Day 6 in Table A5—in Appendix A—which showed a lower accuracy for all models for that 
day as the balanced version of the data was used. Although that day only had 11 attacks, RF was able 
to build good predictive models with good evaluation accuracy, except for Day 4’s traffic. The ability 
of RF to learn from Day 6 traffic was linked to its bagging technique. In contrast to C5.0, this sampling 
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technique prevented RF from overfitting, which in turn produced models with good generalisation 
capabilities. This gave RF more chance of detecting novel attacks, as demonstrated in these 
experiments.  
 
Figure 10. Nemenyi test (95% confidence level) on the RF algorithm models using different feature 
sets and different data balances after applying the adaptive cut-off approach. 
The RF algorithm showed the best results of the evaluated ML algorithms. As illustrated by the 
results in Table A5, RF’s accuracy would not have been better than that of the other algorithms if the 
fixed optimal (CV) threshold of its models had been used to assess their accuracy. However, with the 
cut-off adaptation approach, RF’s accuracy improved significantly.  
The RF algorithm can take longer to train, depending on the complexity of the training data. 
However, once the model is built, its evaluation of a new instance is reasonably fast.  
As expected, it consumed a lot of resources (memory) at the model building phase, and this 
consumption increased with the size of the training data. This was a result of the number of bootstrap 
samples it generated, which were used to build trees in parallel threads. The resulting models were 
quite large compared to the SVM and C5.0 models, and their sizes increased as the complexity of the 
training data increased.   
SVM algorithm 
Similar to C5.0 and RF algorithms, Friedman’s test was used to assess the above hypothesis for 
the SVM models. This test revealed that there was not enough evidence to support this hypothesis, 
χ2(9) = 13.1, p = 0.158 ≮ 0.05.   
The SVM algorithm exhibited similar behaviour to the C5.0 algorithm. All of its statistical tests 
revealed insignificant effects between one feature set and another, and there was no sign that the 
improved accuracy of its models was influenced by any of the data balancing effects. As with the 
C5.0 algorithm, different behaviours were exhibited on different days, as presented in Table A6 (see 
Appendix A), so no consistent pattern could be deduced.  
Although the SVM algorithm showed some overall improvement on days when the reduced 
feature sets were used instead of the Full features set, this behaviour was not consistent. As a linear 
version of SVM was used, this effect could have been caused by the non-linear nature of the data on 
those days where SVM failed to perform well. 
Figure 11 summarises all of the accuracy readings in the tables (Table A4, Table A5 and Table 
A6) after the threshold adaptation process was applied. It compares the average accuracy of all the 
C5.0, RF and SVM models. This plot shows the average accuracy for each day’s model for all of the 
tested ML algorithms. The standard error of the average accuracy for each model is illustrated by 
vertical bars. For each algorithm, the mean accuracy of all models across all days for every 
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combination of feature sets and data balance type is represented by a horizontal dashed line. As this 
plot shows, RF was always the highest performing of the ML algorithms evaluated. Unlike C5.0 and 
SVM, RF showed the most stable results with the least variability.  
Although Figure 11 shows that the highest average accuracy of the RF models was attained when 
the Full features set was used, the difference in the average accuracy of its models was very small, 
unlike the accuracy of the C5.0 and SVM models, which showed higher variations in accuracy. 
Therefore, RF models could be generated using a reduced feature set without any significant decrease 
in their average accuracy, but with a significant gain in speed. Figure 11 also shows that there was 
only a high variation in the accuracy of models for Day 6; however, given that this day was 
problematic, with its skewed balance, this level of accuracy is more than acceptable. Moreover, in a 
real life scenario it would not be sensible to build a model using such data, hence this example is an 
extreme case, which is presented here merely to demonstrate that the RF algorithm performed 
reasonably well.  
 
Figure 11. Comparison plot of the average accuracy of every C5.0, RF and SVM model for every 
feature set and data balance combination. 
In general, although a linear SVM implementation was used in these experiments, it showed 
some good results. For example, on average, the accuracy of models trained on the original and 
balanced version of Day 4’s traffic, using MDG features, was above 90% (see Figure 11). The accuracy 
of models trained using the MDA features on the original version of Day 6 traffic (which only had 11 
attacks), was also above 89%. With such results, more analysis is required to identify the right 
combination of fast kernel function and parameter tuning to improve the overall SVM results. This 
would make it an attractive solution for IDS problems. 
8. Conclusion 
In this work, we have presented the effect of prediction threshold (cut-off) adaptation on 
improving detection accuracy of binary-based prediction (IDS) models. We also presented how such 
an approach will benefit the IDS domain is maintaining detection models for long periods of time. 
The results of our experiments show that the adapted threshold provided a more accurate reading of 
a model’s true accuracy in comparison to the use of a fixed threshold. From these experiments, we 
highlight the following characteristics of threshold adaptation: 
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 An adaptive cut-off (threshold) approach results in better classification performance than a fixed 
threshold. 
 Using a single cut-off (threshold) will lead to misleading results, which could result in a decision 
to terminate a good prediction model that merely required some tuning.  
 Threshold adaptation approach may not show significant improvement to a model’s accuracy 
when the testing data exhibits the same statistical properties as the training data. 
The results of these analyses showed that RF outperformed the other algorithms (C5.0 and SVM) 
in its ability to predict new traffic and the detection of novel anomalies. It also showed that, before 
cut-off adaptation, all of the ML algorithms performed as poorly as each other, but that the adaptive 
cut-off approach increased their overall accuracy, with RF performing the best. Moreover, RF 
suffered no significant loss in accuracy when the reduced feature sets were used, and its predictions 
did not improve when the data was balanced, given that the prediction threshold is constantly 
adapted. This gives RF the advantage of being able to build models using original data with a reduced 
feature set, which will save a considerable amount of time in training and testing, which makes this 
algorithm more attractive for such problems. 
In these analyses, the gAcc measures were used as the model assessment criteria to avoid issues 
with imbalanced data. The accuracy of all models was assessed using the non-parametric Friedman 
test to identify any significant differences. Cut-off adaptation and the algorithm used were the most 
important effects that contributed to any significant difference in a model’s accuracy.  
Furthermore, this study also showed that the K-folds cross-validation (CV) analysis on the entire 
dataset reports over-optimistic results that would not reflect the true capability of detection models 
in real life setups. This technique failed to reveal and assess the true power of the detection capability 
of different ML models. For example, the C5.0 ranked higher than SVM when this technique was 
applied on the entire datasets (as in the first setup of the first experiment), however, it was no better 
when more a natural setup (prospective sampling technique) was in effect. As a result, research 
results using the K-folds CV technique should be carefully addressed in domains such as IDS.  
In future work, we will investigate new approaches in identifying the optimal adaptive 
prediction threshold (cut-off) based on a small randomly selected sample of an evaluated traffic. 
Another potential avenue for further investigation is including larger, real industrial datasets with 
real world attacks and unknown labels, to determine if this research can be generalised and to 
compare the detection accuracy to some production IDS. 
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Appendix A 
This section presents the results of the experiments conducted in this paper. Table A1, Table A2 
and Table A3 present the results of the second setup of the first set of experiments (discussed in 
Section 6) for every algorithm (C5.0, RF and SVM) with different datasets (gureKDD, SEA and AGR).  
Table A4, Table A5 and Table A6 present the results of the second set of experiments (discussed 
in Section 7) for every algorithm (C5.0, RF and SVM) on the STA2018 dataset. These tables show the 
results of each model under different feature sets (Full, MDA, MDG, MDABal. and MDGBal.) and data 
balances (original and balanced).  
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Each shaded cell—of these tables—contains the maximum G-mean accuracy (gAcc) achieved at 
the K-folds cross-validation stage, where the model’s threshold was set. Every other cell contains two 
performance measures. The top measure is the model’s gAcc on the test file when its fixed optimal 
(CV) cut-off was used, and the second measure is the model’s gAcc when the cut-off was adapted for 
the test data. The measure in bold is the greater of the two measures. 
Table A1. C5.0 model’s performance on different datasets with various effects (before and after 
threshold adaptation). 
 File 1 File 2 File 3 File 4 File 5 File 6 File 7 
g
u
re
K
D
D
 
Model 1 0.3904 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
Model 2 
0.2181 
0.8125 
0.9981 
0.2108 
0.9740 
0.7154 
0.9248 
0.2162 
0.9715 
0.5786 
0.9646 
0.1850 
0.9805 
Model 3 
0.0000 
0.8884 
0.7127 
0.9150 
0.9995 
0.8198 
0.8997 
0.9874 
0.9956 
0.9849 
0.9928 
0.9981 
0.9994 
Model 4 
0.8727 
0.9770 
0.4109 
0.8656 
0.9948 
0.9949 
0.9981 
0.9862 
0.9965 
0.9740 
0.9944 
0.9988 
0.9995 
Model 5 
0.8448 
0.9740 
0.3315 
0.7145 
0.9963 
0.9965 
0.9107 
0.9453 
0.9998 
0.8525 
0.9977 
0.9995 
0.9995 
Model 6 
0.8451 
0.9997 
0.9610 
0.9948 
0.9986 
0.9989 
0.9093 
0.9128 
0.9996 
0.9997 
0.9998 
0.9994 
0.9994 
Model 7 
0.8161 
0.9504 
0.9894 
0.9903 
0.8435 
0.9908 
0.8454 
0.9308 
0.9321 
0.9959 
0.9802 
0.9939 
0.9998 
S
E
A
 
Model 1 0.8731 
0.8740 
0.8744 
0.8046 
0.8517 
0.8052 
0.8522 
0.8361 
0.8502 
0.8362 
0.8503 
N
o
 r
es
u
lt
s 
as
 t
h
er
e 
w
er
e 
o
n
ly
 6
 f
il
es
. Model 2 
0.8726 
0.8736 
0.8731 
0.8086 
0.8486 
0.8074 
0.8493 
0.8373 
0.8471 
0.8372 
0.8468 
Model 3 
0.8320 
0.8574 
0.8319 
0.8586 
0.8898 
0.8896 
0.8901 
0.8592 
0.8599 
0.8593 
0.8600 
Model 4 
0.8317 
0.8612 
0.8319 
0.8617 
0.8906 
0.8906 
0.8902 
0.8599 
0.8603 
0.8599 
0.8603 
Model 5 
0.8387 
0.8700 
0.8394 
0.8704 
0.8781 
0.8821 
0.8775 
0.8821 
0.2959 
0.8567 
0.8568 
0.8569 
Model 6 
0.8391 
0.8686 
0.8395 
0.8691 
0.8762 
0.8819 
0.8759 
0.8821 
0.8563 
0.8570 
0.8559 
A
G
R
 
Model 1 0.9449 
0.9443 
0.9445 
0.4844 
0.4932 
0.4850 
0.4930 
0.6873 
0.6888 
0.6873 
0.6885 
N
o
 r
es
u
lt
s 
as
 t
h
er
e 
w
er
e 
o
n
ly
 6
 f
il
es
. Model 2 
0.9447 
0.9448 
0.9448 
0.4835 
0.4938 
0.4829 
0.4934 
0.6871 
0.6882 
0.6867 
0.6882 
Model 3 
0.4925 
0.4932 
0.4925 
0.4929 
0.9341 
0.9341 
0.9341 
0.6968 
0.6984 
0.6976 
0.6990 
Model 4 
0.4907 
0.4916 
0.4900 
0.4911 
0.9328 
0.9334 
0.9339 
0.6956 
0.6977 
0.6964 
0.6985 
Model 5 
0.7114 
0.7492 
0.7114 
0.7484 
0.7382 
0.7623 
0.7386 
0.7624 
0.7059 
0.7079 
0.7081 
Model 6 
0.7147 
0.7463 
0.7140 
0.7459 
0.7360 
0.7626 
0.7376 
0.7628 
0.7082 
0.7085 
0.7101 
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Figure A1. The gAcc curves for the C5.0 algorithm (see Table A1). 
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Table A2. Random Forest (RF) model’s performance on different datasets with various effects (before 
and after threshold adaptation). 
 File 1 File 2 File 3 File 4 File 5 File 6 File 7 
g
u
re
K
D
D
 
Model 1 
0.9987 
0.9752 
0.9777 
0.8538 
0.9914 
0.7948 
0.9423 
0.6733 
0.9937 
0.7410 
0.9929 
0.9673 
0.9952 
Model 2 0.3085 
0.9930 
0.9984 
0.9807 
0.9851 
0.9103 
0.9359 
0.9657 
0.9699 
0.9531 
0.9563 
0.9859 
0.9963 
Model 3 0.2182 
0.9205 
0.6430 
0.9902 
0.9996 
0.5304 
0.9324 
0.9898 
0.9951 
0.8262 
0.9930 
0.9815 
0.9994 
Model 4 0.8448 
0.9970 
0.7060 
0.9894 
0.9953 
0.9966 
0.9983 
0.9862 
0.9990 
0.9747 
0.9947 
0.9987 
0.9995 
Model 5 0.8165 
0.9736 
0.6326 
0.8836 
0.9968 
0.9969 
0.9311 
0.9418 
0.9999 
0.9980 
0.9981 
0.9996 
0.9996 
Model 6 0.8863 
0.9981 
0.9542 
0.9965 
0.9989 
0.9991 
0.9082 
0.9486 
0.9998 
0.9998 
0.9999 
0.9994 
0.9996 
Model 7 0.8448 
0.9754 
0.9841 
0.9908 
0.9884 
0.9986 
0.9300 
0.9352 
0.9914 
0.9970 
0.9961 
0.9974 
0.9999 
S
E
A
 
Model 1 
0.8750 
0.8758 
0.8758 
0.8696 
0.8764 
0.8027 
0.8053 
0.8358 
0.8364 
0.8358 
0.8364 
N
o
 r
es
u
lt
s 
as
 t
h
er
e 
w
er
e 
o
n
ly
 6
 f
il
es
. 
Model 2 0.8752 
0.8752 
0.8757 
0.8026 
0.8053 
0.8680 
0.8759 
0.8357 
0.8363 
0.8357 
0.8363 
Model 3 0.8536 
0.9113 
0.8323 
0.8338 
0.8920 
0.8924 
0.8926 
0.8609 
0.8610 
0.8604 
0.8607 
Model 4 0.8319 
0.8333 
0.8636 
0.9113 
0.8921 
0.8921 
0.8925 
0.8609 
0.8612 
0.8606 
0.8609 
Model 5 0.8389 
0.8685 
0.8393 
0.8695 
0.8782 
0.8832 
0.8786 
0.8839 
0.8576 
0.8572 
0.8576 
Model 6 0.8369 
0.8691 
0.8368 
0.8695 
0.8806 
0.8829 
0.8815 
0.8835 
0.8579 
0.8579 
0.8574 
A
G
R
 
Model 1 
0.9483 
0.9482 
0.9484 
0.4774 
0.5042 
0.4812 
0.5040 
0.6869 
0.6895 
0.6871 
0.6893 
N
o
 r
es
u
lt
s 
as
 t
h
er
e 
w
er
e 
o
n
ly
 6
 f
il
es
. 
Model 2 0.9488 
0.9490 
0.9486 
0.4788 
0.5059 
0.4762 
0.5054 
0.6858 
0.6894 
0.6856 
0.6895 
Model 3 0.4900 
0.4939 
0.4933 
0.4940 
0.9387 
0.9387 
0.9395 
0.6989 
0.7007 
0.6995 
0.7019 
Model 4 0.4928 
0.4939 
0.4902 
0.4942 
0.9390 
0.9391 
0.9398 
0.6995 
0.7011 
0.6997 
0.7016 
Model 5 0.7208 
0.7620 
0.7212 
0.7620 
0.7401 
0.7785 
0.7402 
0.7779 
0.7127 
0.7144 
0.7149 
Model 6 0.7248 
0.7607 
0.7243 
0.7608 
0.7351 
0.7788 
0.7367 
0.7805 
0.7139 
0.7140 
0.7129 
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Figure A2. The gAcc curves for Random Forest algorithm (see Table A2). 
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Table A3. SVM model’s performance on different datasets with various effects (before and after 
threshold adaptation). 
 File 1 File 2 File 3 File 4 File 5 File 6 File 7 
g
u
re
K
D
D
 
Model 1 0.9250 
0.6471 
0.6545 
0.8171 
0.9727 
0.2401 
0.3504 
0.8974 
0.9695 
0.8250 
0.9123 
0.9665 
0.9715 
Model 2 
0.0000 
0.8253 
0.9869 
0.1701 
0.5024 
0.3076 
0.4525 
0.1176 
0.5163 
0.3457 
0.5285 
0.1116 
0.6131 
Model 3 
0.8092 
0.8303 
0.7206 
0.9022 
0.9977 
0.7544 
0.9028 
0.9699 
0.9793 
0.9583 
0.9636 
0.9791 
0.9878 
Model 4 
0.9195 
0.9196 
0.2794 
0.6683 
0.9678 
0.9941 
0.9591 
0.9766 
0.9958 
0.9783 
0.9840 
0.9867 
0.9986 
Model 5 
0.8724 
0.9757 
0.2233 
0.6778 
0.9865 
0.9922 
0.9172 
0.9339 
0.9992 
0.8503 
0.8507 
0.9983 
0.9985 
Model 6 
0.8443 
0.9531 
0.2804 
0.6929 
0.9894 
0.9907 
0.9145 
0.9270 
0.9976 
0.9979 
0.9970 
0.9986 
0.9986 
Model 7 
0.8165 
0.8518 
0.3163 
0.8853 
0.9944 
0.9944 
0.9107 
0.9366 
0.9960 
0.9962 
0.8476 
0.9434 
0.9994 
S
E
A
 
Model 1 0.8763 
0.8771 
0.8771 
0.8018 
0.8936 
0.8016 
0.8941 
0.8358 
0.8617 
0.8360 
0.8615 
N
o
 r
es
u
lt
s 
as
 t
h
er
e 
w
er
e 
o
n
ly
 6
 f
il
es
. 
Model 2 
0.8759 
0.8760 
0.8765 
0.8021 
0.8928 
0.8018 
0.8933 
0.8356 
0.8613 
0.8359 
0.8610 
Model 3 
0.8319 
0.8763 
0.8320 
0.8770 
0.8933 
0.8939 
0.8940 
0.8615 
0.8617 
0.8613 
0.8615 
Model 4 
0.8319 
0.8763 
0.8321 
0.8769 
0.8933 
0.8933 
0.8938 
0.8615 
0.8616 
0.8612 
0.8613 
Model 5 
0.8325 
0.8759 
0.8326 
0.8765 
0.8924 
0.8928 
0.8929 
0.8932 
0.8614 
0.8610 
0.8611 
Model 6 
0.8331 
0.8756 
0.8332 
0.8760 
0.8914 
0.8923 
0.8918 
0.8927 
0.8612 
0.8612 
0.8609 
A
G
R
 
Model 1 0.5529 
0.5614 
0.5615 
0.4695 
0.5106 
0.4676 
0.5079 
0.5148 
0.5211 
0.5112 
0.5178 
N
o
 r
es
u
lt
s 
as
 t
h
er
e 
w
er
e 
o
n
ly
 6
 f
il
es
. 
Model 2 
0.5494 
0.5498 
0.5479 
0.4829 
0.5045 
0.4813 
0.5032 
0.5148 
0.5174 
0.5125 
0.5161 
Model 3 
0.4879 
0.4995 
0.4877 
0.5004 
0.6440 
0.6460 
0.6462 
0.5656 
0.5659 
0.5676 
0.5685 
Model 4 
0.4862 
0.4991 
0.4861 
0.5005 
0.6450 
0.6453 
0.6467 
0.5652 
0.5664 
0.5673 
0.5688 
Model 5 
0.4867 
0.4990 
0.4862 
0.5003 
0.6338 
0.6348 
0.6352 
0.6365 
0.5598 
0.5620 
0.5623 
Model 6 
0.4892 
0.4996 
0.4889 
0.5006 
0.6357 
0.6374 
0.6362 
0.6384 
0.5615 
0.5617 
0.5632 
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Figure A3. The gAcc curves for the SVM algorithm (see Table A3). 
Information 2019, 10, 159 34 of 41 
 
Table A4. The gAcc of models for the fixed optimal (CV) and adapted cut-off (threshold) for the C5.0 
algorithm. 
 
  Original Balance 
 
  Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 
F
u
ll
 
MDL 2 0.9996 
0.0099 0.0176 0.0053 0.8062 0.0568 
0.9999 
0.0100 0.0241 0.0053 0.8995 0.0562 
0.5882 0.5045 0.0148 0.9999 0.9934 0.9044 0.6387 0.0144 1.0000 0.9879 
MDL 3 
0.5967 
0.9834 
0.8106 0.0105 0.0000 0.9477 0.9014 
0.9823 
0.8661 0.0130 0.6304 0.7753 
0.9745 0.9137 0.0211 0.5650 0.9776 0.9487 0.9043 0.0134 0.9652 0.8440 
MDL 4 
0.0375 0.9373 
0.9813 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0316 0.9916 0.9249 
0.9815 
0.0129 0.9985 0.7109 
0.9937 0.9507 0.0130 0.9514 0.0616 0.9931 0.9271 0.0176 0.9989 0.9900 
MDL 5 
0.9982 0.0000 0.0216 
0.9977 
0.9045 0.0875 0.8820 0.0100 0.3610 
0.9975 
0.8523 0.7759 
0.9993 0.1950 0.4956 0.9999 0.9895 0.9934 0.1419 0.6242 0.9966 0.9907 
MDL 6 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.4606 
0.0000 0.9910 0.0200 0.0250 0.0479 
1.0000 
0.7458 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9988 0.1485 0.0278 0.0480 0.9980 
MDL 7 
0.9901 0.9151 0.4357 0.0043 0.9998 
0.9999 
0.9956 0.3826 0.3916 0.0092 0.9999 
1.0000 
0.9945 0.9413 0.7629 0.0132 0.9998 0.9962 0.9210 0.6703 0.0258 1.0000 
M
D
A
 
MDL 2 0.9998 
0.0000 0.0279 0.0479 0.8528 0.0568 
1.0000 
0.0000 0.0279 0.0479 0.8528 0.0568 
0.0940 0.0279 0.0479 0.8528 0.0568 0.0940 0.0279 0.0479 0.8528 0.0568 
MDL 3 
0.9814 
0.9838 
0.5062 0.2146 0.7327 0.1403 0.5278 
0.9826 
0.8504 0.8807 0.8344 0.8673 
0.9845 0.5720 0.7332 0.9890 0.4531 0.7520 0.8558 0.9420 0.8395 0.9405 
MDL 4 
0.1127 0.8999 
0.9802 
0.0402 0.3013 0.0283 0.7905 0.9193 
0.9800 
0.0790 0.9985 0.0647 
0.6653 0.9476 0.3447 0.8502 0.1108 0.9882 0.9299 0.3659 0.9992 0.4175 
MDL 5 
0.9902 0.0100 0.0983 
0.9977 
0.8528 0.0550 0.9087 0.0100 0.6697 
0.9974 
0.9478 0.8538 
0.9990 0.4568 0.4944 0.9504 0.1438 0.9857 0.0378 0.8277 0.9896 0.9923 
MDL 6 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.4606 
0.0000 0.9808 0.0141 0.0128 0.0473 
1.0000 
0.0532 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.8035 0.4143 0.7486 0.9999 
MDL 7 
0.9923 0.8980 0.4348 0.0485 0.9998 
0.9998 
0.9469 0.1264 0.0249 0.7837 1.0000 
0.9998 
0.9976 0.9286 0.4498 0.9837 1.0000 0.9940 0.9236 0.8137 0.9907 1.0000 
M
D
G
 
MDL 2 0.9998 
0.0000 0.0279 0.0479 0.8528 0.0568 
1.0000 
0.0000 0.0279 0.0479 0.8528 0.0568 
0.0940 0.0279 0.0479 0.8528 0.0568 0.0940 0.0279 0.0479 0.8528 0.0568 
MDL 3 
0.1309 
0.9702 
0.8138 0.5949 0.0000 0.6922 0.4031 
0.9656 
0.8976 0.5522 0.5120 0.7539 
0.8279 0.8979 0.7917 0.4171 0.7796 0.8978 0.9092 0.6895 0.7127 0.8859 
MDL 4 
0.6496 0.9160 
0.9431 
0.9906 0.0000 0.9976 0.5688 0.8835 
0.9165 
0.9049 0.0000 0.9666 
0.9799 0.9246 0.9912 0.9815 0.9977 0.8639 0.9026 0.9100 0.0000 0.9792 
MDL 5 
0.9208 0.0200 0.0176 
0.9969 
0.0000 0.9611 0.9927 0.0141 0.3249 
0.9972 
0.8519 0.9978 
0.9896 0.2523 0.8186 0.9529 0.9836 0.9961 0.8160 0.8821 0.9965 0.9982 
MDL 6 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.4606 
0.0000 0.0614 0.0100 0.0000 0.0092 
1.0000 
0.0142 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9935 0.8094 0.4154 0.0822 0.9993 
MDL 7 
0.9943 0.8910 0.4342 0.0485 0.9999 
0.9999 
0.9867 0.9068 0.4390 0.5440 0.9525 
0.9997 
0.9976 0.9253 0.4423 0.9837 1.0000 0.9944 0.9142 0.6559 0.9853 0.9962 
M
D
A
B
al
. 
MDL 2 0.9998 
0.0000 0.0279 0.0479 0.8528 0.0568 
1.0000 
0.0000 0.0279 0.0479 0.8528 0.0568 
0.0940 0.0279 0.0479 0.8528 0.0568 0.0940 0.0279 0.0479 0.8528 0.0568 
MDL 3 
0.9849 
0.9833 
0.5069 0.8782 0.5156 0.4736 0.7077 
0.9821 
0.6074 0.5015 0.7124 0.0816 
0.9876 0.5967 0.9296 0.9843 0.8484 0.8853 0.8378 0.8607 0.7731 0.4364 
MDL 4 
0.1337 0.9435 
0.9802 
0.0580 0.3013 0.0245 0.9852 0.6290 
0.9805 
0.0627 0.9958 0.4256 
0.6646 0.9492 0.9824 0.8496 0.1062 0.9906 0.9232 0.1455 0.9971 0.6606 
MDL 5 
0.9984 0.1142 0.0993 
0.9977 
0.7977 0.0568 0.8156 0.0100 0.0278 
0.9974 
0.7368 0.3558 
0.9995 0.4586 0.7236 0.9367 0.6729 0.9888 0.1569 0.6789 0.9954 0.9915 
MDL 6 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.4606 
0.0000 0.0614 0.0100 0.0125 0.0092 
1.0000 
0.0142 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9985 0.8062 0.4115 0.7465 0.9996 
MDL 7 
0.9923 0.8952 0.4348 0.0485 0.9998 
0.9998 
0.9873 0.1978 0.0892 0.7895 0.9999 
0.9998 
0.9976 0.9285 0.4445 0.9829 1.0000 0.9940 0.9236 0.8137 0.9907 1.0000 
M
D
G
B
al
. 
MDL 2 0.9998 
0.0000 0.0279 0.0479 0.8528 0.0568 
1.0000 
0.0000 0.0279 0.0479 0.8528 0.0568 
0.0940 0.0279 0.0479 0.8528 0.0568 0.0940 0.0279 0.0479 0.8528 0.0568 
MDL 3 
0.2910 
0.9827 
0.6145 0.1415 0.0000 0.4229 0.8819 
0.9820 
0.8189 0.9222 0.5312 0.6688 
0.4477 0.8308 0.7589 0.0000 0.8031 0.8896 0.8388 0.9300 0.5783 0.8254 
MDL 4 
0.6499 0.9485 
0.9811 
0.9764 0.3011 0.0567 0.9824 0.9265 
0.9803 
0.7625 0.8510 0.0615 
0.9342 0.9497 0.9799 0.9918 0.3565 0.9826 0.9265 0.9326 0.9341 0.0756 
MDL 5 
0.9673 0.0158 0.1048 
0.9976 
0.7977 0.0531 0.8201 0.0000 0.0736 
0.9973 
0.8510 0.4139 
0.9985 0.4339 0.4977 0.9522 0.0680 0.9485 0.1562 0.7646 0.9005 0.8068 
MDL 6 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.4606 
0.0000 0.0614 0.0100 0.0000 0.0092 
1.0000 
0.0142 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9935 0.8094 0.4154 0.0822 0.9993 
MDL 7 
0.9929 0.1801 0.0729 0.7814 0.9997 
0.9998 
0.9883 0.0064 0.0139 0.0533 0.9998 
0.9999 
0.9954 0.9267 0.4813 0.9778 1.0000 0.9900 0.9054 0.5412 0.9913 1.0000 
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Table A5. The gAcc of models for the fixed optimal (CV) and adapted cut-off (threshold) for the Random 
Forest (RF) algorithm. 
 
  Original Balance 
 
  Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 
F
u
ll
 
MDL 2 1.0000 
0.0042 0.0279 0.0482 1.0000 0.0602 
1.0000 
0.0100 0.0216 0.0476 0.9535 0.0559 
0.9272 0.9478 0.9094 1.0000 0.9987 0.9293 0.9413 0.9257 1.0000 0.9987 
MDL 3 
0.9521 
0.9849 
0.9213 0.6884 0.8560 0.9411 0.9663 
0.9848 
0.9191 0.7498 0.9530 0.9758 
0.9932 0.9739 0.9577 0.9870 0.9976 0.9925 0.9688 0.9340 0.9793 0.9987 
MDL 4 
0.9428 0.9301 
0.9827 
0.8425 0.8832 0.9404 0.9762 0.9237 
0.9829 
0.8991 0.9268 0.9688 
0.9945 0.9560 0.9920 0.9998 0.9978 0.9948 0.9471 0.9858 0.9997 0.9882 
MDL 5 
0.9997 0.0133 0.0648 
0.9978 
0.9535 0.0585 0.9888 0.2259 0.6808 
0.9981 
0.9934 0.9925 
0.9999 0.9205 0.9395 1.0000 0.9976 0.9971 0.9156 0.9302 0.9998 0.9926 
MDL 6 
0.9912 0.0000 0.0250 0.0479 
1.0000 
0.0568 0.0217 0.0100 0.0125 0.0053 
1.0000 
0.0142 
1.0000 0.9120 0.5737 0.9671 0.9998 0.9999 0.8685 0.6837 0.1048 0.9998 
MDL 7 
0.9964 0.9140 0.4314 0.7864 1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0217 0.0100 0.0125 0.0341 0.5279 
1.0000 
0.9979 0.9351 0.9340 0.9911 1.0000 0.9998 0.9381 0.9319 0.9755 1.0000 
M
D
A
 
MDL 2 1.0000 
0.0463 0.0279 0.0482 1.0000 0.0585 
1.0000 
0.0100 0.0216 0.0476 0.8528 0.0564 
0.9308 0.9417 0.9322 1.0000 0.9983 0.9281 0.9504 0.7999 1.0000 0.9984 
MDL 3 
0.9790 
0.9848 
0.9636 0.9089 0.9570 0.9890 0.9683 
0.9848 
0.9197 0.8158 0.8781 0.9282 
0.9895 0.9738 0.9490 0.9844 0.9963 0.9927 0.9690 0.9336 0.9839 0.9983 
MDL 4 
0.9493 0.9374 
0.9826 
0.8913 0.8956 0.9448 0.9463 0.9269 
0.9827 
0.8882 0.9024 0.9467 
0.9947 0.9557 0.9917 0.9971 0.9984 0.9948 0.9449 0.9889 0.9993 0.9942 
MDL 5 
0.9997 0.0141 0.0872 
0.9978 
0.9535 0.0619 0.9891 0.2439 0.6620 
0.9981 
0.9935 0.9933 
0.9999 0.9162 0.9388 1.0000 0.9951 0.9996 0.9218 0.9411 0.9981 0.9935 
MDL 6 
0.9983 0.0100 0.0250 0.0479 
1.0000 
0.0568 0.0217 0.0100 0.0176 0.0053 
1.0000 
0.0142 
1.0000 0.8553 0.4649 0.3326 0.9999 1.0000 0.9320 0.4956 0.1731 1.0000 
MDL 7 
0.9933 0.9309 0.4459 0.9875 1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0217 0.0100 0.0125 0.0367 0.4053 
1.0000 
0.9971 0.9360 0.9370 0.9911 1.0000 0.9998 0.9355 0.9280 0.9699 1.0000 
M
D
G
 
MDL 2 1.0000 
0.0452 0.0279 0.0482 1.0000 0.0585 
1.0000 
0.0100 0.0216 0.0473 0.8528 0.0561 
0.9296 0.9317 0.8425 1.0000 0.9982 0.9287 0.9457 0.9430 1.0000 0.9984 
MDL 3 
0.5035 
0.9780 
0.9171 0.6307 0.0000 0.7868 0.5308 
0.9698 
0.9051 0.5622 0.0000 0.6543 
0.8340 0.9185 0.8195 0.7887 0.9471 0.8000 0.9112 0.7204 0.7087 0.8924 
MDL 4 
0.7032 0.9160 
0.9432 
0.9856 0.0000 0.9884 0.6800 0.8996 
0.8906 
0.9829 0.0000 0.9531 
0.7703 0.9242 0.9913 0.8236 0.9974 0.8676 0.9000 0.9829 0.7499 0.9538 
MDL 5 
0.1390 0.0100 0.0254 
0.9978 
0.6742 0.0375 0.9897 0.0223 0.5450 
0.9981 
0.9999 0.3540 
0.9992 0.8518 0.9138 0.9996 0.9976 0.9926 0.8016 0.8817 1.0000 0.9982 
MDL 6 
0.9982 0.0000 0.0250 0.0479 
1.0000 
0.0568 0.0217 0.0100 0.0125 0.0053 
1.0000 
0.0142 
1.0000 0.8573 0.4349 0.6449 0.9998 1.0000 0.8710 0.7446 0.0767 1.0000 
MDL 7 
0.9926 0.9353 0.4493 0.9911 0.9999 
1.0000 
0.0217 0.0100 0.0125 0.0136 0.4116 
1.0000 
0.9972 0.9357 0.9354 0.9912 1.0000 1.0000 0.9376 0.9377 0.9700 1.0000 
M
D
A
B
al
. 
MDL 2 1.0000 
0.0418 0.0279 0.0482 1.0000 0.0586 
1.0000 
0.0100 0.0216 0.0473 0.8528 0.0559 
0.9331 0.9434 0.9739 1.0000 0.9985 0.9277 0.9460 0.9603 1.0000 0.9985 
MDL 3 
0.9758 
0.9848 
0.9558 0.8755 0.8884 0.9777 0.9742 
0.9849 
0.9122 0.8515 0.8980 0.9522 
0.9933 0.9747 0.9604 0.9826 0.9965 0.9919 0.9715 0.9103 0.9833 0.9983 
MDL 4 
0.9505 0.9349 
0.9824 
0.8801 0.8903 0.9464 0.9508 0.9275 
0.9827 
0.8870 0.8912 0.9422 
0.9947 0.9560 0.9913 0.9960 0.9982 0.9945 0.9442 0.9897 0.9991 0.9864 
MDL 5 
0.9996 0.0141 0.0671 
0.9978 
0.9535 0.0619 0.9868 0.2331 0.6778 
0.9981 
0.9933 0.9934 
0.9999 0.9163 0.9402 0.9999 0.9984 0.9973 0.9141 0.9344 0.9969 0.9941 
MDL 6 
0.9947 0.0000 0.0250 0.0479 
1.0000 
0.0568 0.0217 0.0100 0.0125 0.0053 
1.0000 
0.0142 
1.0000 0.8610 0.4367 0.9482 0.9998 1.0000 0.8753 0.4526 0.3582 1.0000 
MDL 7 
0.9955 0.9148 0.4329 0.9083 1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0217 0.0100 0.0125 0.0465 0.9535 
1.0000 
0.9976 0.9366 0.9349 0.9907 1.0000 0.9997 0.9335 0.9364 0.9680 1.0000 
M
D
G
B
al
. 
MDL 2 1.0000 
0.0457 0.0279 0.0482 1.0000 0.0585 
1.0000 
0.0100 0.0216 0.0473 0.8528 0.0560 
0.9257 0.9409 0.9439 1.0000 0.9983 0.9272 0.9512 0.8091 1.0000 0.9984 
MDL 3 
0.9795 
0.9850 
0.9346 0.8227 0.8250 0.8990 0.9710 
0.9850 
0.8950 0.7824 0.7985 0.8641 
0.9849 0.9556 0.8257 0.9309 0.9231 0.9892 0.9517 0.8583 0.9215 0.9974 
MDL 4 
0.9571 0.9339 
0.9827 
0.8879 0.8889 0.9422 0.9438 0.9313 
0.9826 
0.8991 0.9096 0.9547 
0.9923 0.9540 0.9696 0.9346 0.9962 0.9947 0.9411 0.9752 0.9521 0.9949 
MDL 5 
0.9975 0.0141 0.0330 
0.9978 
0.9535 0.0531 0.9881 0.0903 0.6163 
0.9981 
0.9931 0.9366 
0.9993 0.8693 0.9049 0.9995 0.9954 0.9941 0.9133 0.9340 0.9951 0.9927 
MDL 6 
0.9952 0.0141 0.0250 0.0479 
1.0000 
0.0568 0.0217 0.0100 0.0125 0.0053 
1.0000 
0.0142 
1.0000 0.8642 0.4449 0.9611 0.9999 1.0000 0.8675 0.5907 0.0747 1.0000 
MDL 7 
0.9970 0.9036 0.4303 0.0505 1.0000 
1.0000 
0.0217 0.0100 0.0125 0.0053 0.4273 
1.0000 
0.9974 0.9391 0.9365 0.9908 1.0000 1.0000 0.9339 0.9412 0.9893 1.0000 
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Table A6. The gAcc of models for the fixed optimal (CV) and adapted cut-off (threshold) for the SVM 
algorithm. 
 
  Original Balance 
 
  Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 
F
u
ll
 
MDL 2 1.0000 
0.1630 0.3695 0.0573 0.9857 0.9681 
0.9996 
0.9076 0.5294 0.6040 0.9997 0.8786 
0.1756 0.3977 0.1891 0.9875 0.9703 0.9137 0.5622 0.9011 0.9999 0.9966 
MDL 3 
0.5133 
0.9809 
0.5184 0.3624 0.7800 0.8279 0.4939 
0.9754 
0.4641 0.4042 0.4023 0.4473 
0.9312 0.5200 0.8053 0.9517 0.8661 0.8235 0.6112 0.7456 0.8289 0.8026 
MDL 4 
0.3545 0.9161 
0.9814 
0.0538 0.9182 0.4942 0.1242 0.7312 
0.9800 
0.0160 0.0000 0.0200 
0.9397 0.9457 0.3852 0.9589 0.7560 0.9154 0.9405 0.7563 0.9677 0.8836 
MDL 5 
0.0000 0.1026 0.7030 
0.9961 
0.0000 0.7385 0.0000 0.1387 0.5176 
0.9913 
0.4249 0.7042 
0.8674 0.1761 0.8065 0.9531 0.8429 0.9490 0.1474 0.5208 0.9242 0.7166 
MDL 6 
0.9806 0.8750 0.6296 0.0575 
0.9994 
0.9985 0.3346 0.0282 0.0216 0.1027 
1.0000 
0.5148 
0.9913 0.8931 0.6411 0.5101 0.9990 0.9978 0.1468 0.2367 0.9575 0.8563 
MDL 7 
0.9820 0.1070 0.4882 0.0599 0.9532 
0.9999 
0.9860 0.0489 0.1797 0.9667 0.9995 
0.9999 
0.9906 0.2143 0.6021 0.7417 0.9997 0.9931 0.1611 0.5437 0.9843 0.9995 
M
D
A
 
MDL 2 1.0000 
0.9206 0.4812 0.0542 0.9534 0.0585 
0.9997 
0.6143 0.4374 0.2112 0.9534 0.0568 
0.9224 0.7470 0.1977 0.9999 0.9911 0.6945 0.7889 0.8507 1.0000 0.9921 
MDL 3 
0.0000 
0.9809 
0.8553 0.0237 0.8381 0.1051 0.9330 
0.9765 
0.8737 0.4306 0.7185 0.8755 
0.2443 0.8658 0.0382 0.9337 0.6997 0.9621 0.8743 0.8487 0.9143 0.9184 
MDL 4 
0.6177 0.9447 
0.9810 
0.4665 0.9038 0.0722 0.1466 0.9397 
0.9792 
0.9226 0.0000 0.0317 
0.9725 0.9454 0.5871 0.9978 0.7330 0.8707 0.9413 0.9360 0.9749 0.7675 
MDL 5 
0.0000 0.0307 0.5224 
0.9957 
0.0000 0.0000 0.9178 0.1268 0.5203 
0.9914 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.9743 0.1444 0.6106 0.9529 0.7213 0.9865 0.1812 0.5285 0.9433 0.4924 
MDL 6 
0.9953 0.8535 0.7474 0.9685 
0.9998 
0.0568 0.9992 0.8966 0.3735 0.9686 
1.0000 
0.0568 
0.9993 0.9134 0.8951 0.9806 0.9908 0.9992 0.9242 0.4774 0.9821 0.9402 
MDL 7 
0.2622 0.0691 0.5673 0.8781 0.9515 
0.9999 
0.9795 0.1287 0.2820 0.9669 0.9526 
0.9995 
0.9931 0.1308 0.6090 0.9117 0.9971 0.9922 0.1891 0.6485 0.9902 0.9989 
M
D
G
 
MDL 2 1.0000 
0.7706 0.6099 0.0429 0.9998 0.0602 
0.9997 
0.6713 0.4638 0.0480 0.9534 0.0568 
0.7912 0.8736 0.1953 0.9999 0.9962 0.7400 0.4888 0.4182 1.0000 0.9905 
MDL 3 
0.0000 
0.9391 
0.6141 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.9357 
0.6555 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.5136 0.6847 0.5639 0.3726 0.3531 0.5481 0.6685 0.5900 0.3930 0.5643 
MDL 4 
0.8259 0.7480 
0.8851 
0.9870 0.9831 0.9910 0.9773 0.8656 
0.9092 
0.9834 0.9888 0.9888 
0.9675 0.8062 0.9879 0.9927 0.9956 0.9833 0.8665 0.9884 0.9928 0.9958 
MDL 5 
0.0000 0.0331 0.7649 
0.9950 
0.9528 0.0000 0.0803 0.0695 0.4730 
0.9849 
0.9479 0.0647 
0.9378 0.1450 0.7727 0.9967 0.3657 0.7791 0.1176 0.4839 0.9935 0.2488 
MDL 6 
0.9994 0.0895 0.0250 0.8181 
0.9999 
0.0585 0.9916 0.0000 0.0210 0.7853 
1.0000 
0.0550 
0.9996 0.8718 0.5703 0.9710 0.8849 0.9992 0.8828 0.4595 0.9673 0.9852 
MDL 7 
0.0000 0.9120 0.4510 0.6801 0.9519 
0.9998 
0.8579 0.9096 0.5099 0.9655 0.9517 
0.9995 
0.9742 0.9201 0.6205 0.7580 0.9974 0.9903 0.9100 0.6328 0.9849 0.9982 
M
D
A
B
al
. 
MDL 2 1.0000 
0.8373 0.6823 0.0727 0.9999 0.0585 
0.9994 
0.9202 0.4744 0.0480 0.9999 0.0778 
0.8590 0.8670 0.2976 0.9999 0.9943 0.9307 0.5384 0.7213 1.0000 0.9972 
MDL 3 
0.0000 
0.9807 
0.7562 0.0237 0.8247 0.2069 0.9366 
0.9761 
0.8781 0.4806 0.7460 0.8900 
0.3185 0.7765 0.0382 0.9415 0.7326 0.9593 0.8804 0.8301 0.9235 0.9226 
MDL 4 
0.8749 0.9298 
0.9810 
0.4613 0.9512 0.0837 0.1365 0.9384 
0.9791 
0.9123 0.0000 0.0245 
0.9727 0.9416 0.5578 0.9957 0.6791 0.8578 0.9399 0.9160 0.9818 0.7552 
MDL 5 
0.0000 0.0223 0.4724 
0.9957 
0.0000 0.0000 0.9151 0.1754 0.5767 
0.9924 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.9745 0.1443 0.5477 0.9531 0.7137 0.9868 0.2139 0.6023 0.9410 0.6056 
MDL 6 
0.9789 0.0479 0.5601 0.9336 
1.0000 
0.1291 0.5956 0.7399 0.2373 0.1566 
1.0000 
0.0492 
0.9940 0.3377 0.7603 0.9640 0.9749 0.9984 0.9135 0.4465 0.9562 0.9925 
MDL 7 
0.0795 0.0582 0.6014 0.3942 0.9982 
0.9999 
0.6721 0.1356 0.4007 0.9694 0.9529 
0.9996 
0.9902 0.1513 0.6418 0.5782 0.9986 0.9925 0.2104 0.6328 0.9849 0.9992 
M
D
G
B
al
. 
MDL 2 1.0000 
0.9263 0.7197 0.0474 0.9534 0.0585 
0.9995 
0.8279 0.4580 0.0484 0.9998 0.0776 
0.9311 0.9164 0.5652 0.9999 0.9974 0.9140 0.5588 0.8278 0.9999 0.9976 
MDL 3 
0.8727 
0.9780 
0.6410 0.3583 0.7586 0.8608 0.5333 
0.9695 
0.4830 0.4616 0.6226 0.7089 
0.9800 0.7587 0.5333 0.9002 0.8995 0.8954 0.4834 0.4654 0.6894 0.7755 
MDL 4 
0.1225 0.9035 
0.9801 
0.7684 0.0000 0.0316 0.1238 0.9446 
0.9781 
0.8969 0.0000 0.0245 
0.9823 0.9435 0.9535 0.9851 0.4872 0.8983 0.9449 0.8983 0.8981 0.6145 
MDL 5 
0.0307 0.0141 0.6289 
0.9958 
0.7384 0.0000 0.8877 0.0518 0.0889 
0.9900 
0.0000 0.0000 
0.9694 0.1687 0.6689 0.9521 0.6616 0.9827 0.1426 0.3074 0.9714 0.5188 
MDL 6 
0.9978 0.0100 0.7001 0.5854 
1.0000 
0.1670 0.7335 0.8746 0.3746 0.9650 
1.0000 
0.0531 
0.9996 0.2816 0.7927 0.9595 0.9908 0.9961 0.9199 0.4683 0.9665 0.9930 
MDL 7 
0.0000 0.6830 0.8442 0.5596 0.9527 
0.9998 
0.8509 0.1288 0.2795 0.9692 0.9990 
0.9996 
0.9320 0.7189 0.8991 0.7260 0.9978 0.9921 0.2576 0.6870 0.9873 0.9994 
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